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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
This project is purely theoretical, concerning our fundamental ideas about markets. We propose
a new “contractual” approach describing economic behavior in disequilibrium situations. It
develops a new version of market dynamics, adding one more approach to explain market
functioning.
At least five different competing approaches have been elaborated so far to explain how real
markets operate, and how economy attains equilibrium, namely: Walrasian taˆtonnement, the
disequilibrium dynamic model, Edgeworth’s processes, Smale-type processes and Strategic bar-
gaining approach. Each has some advantages and shortcomings, but none is completely suc-
cessful and convincing. The famous historian of economic thought, Mark Blaug commented
on this puzzle in an interview for “Challenge” (May-June 1998). To the question “What are
the major issues on which we have not made progress?” he replied: “Markets and how they
actually function; that is, how they adjust to match demand and supply. We in economics
know a hell of a lot about equilibrium, but we really don’t know how markets actually get
to equilibrium.” We would add that, in reality, we hardly see equilibrium itself, but rather
some infinite convergence process involving reaction to shocks. This project suggests a sixth
approach to this puzzle.
The basic idea is that in disequilibrium situations, under imperfect information, an agent can
adjust both prices and quantities to disparities in demand and supply. Moreover, she often
trades with a limited group of other agents that can be looked upon as “coalition.” In different
submarkets or coalitions, prices or “terms of trade” can be different, at least in disequilibrium.
The notion of “contracts” enriches the classical concept of the “core” with dynamic details of
making and breaking the personalized agreements and coalitions. The market process can then
be looked upon as series of barter exchanges among emerging and declining agents’ groups. A
new concept of contractual process and its related contractual trajectory express this idea. We
study several reasonable types of contractual trajectories, corresponding to different behavioral
hypotheses. Some of them do converge to Walrasian equilibrium.
Informally, a contractual process describes an infinite horizon, continuous time trajectory. In
each time agents possess, trade and consume some renewable resources. At any moment, any
agent can exchange goods within many groups of agents (coalitions): she does not belong
entirely to any coalition. Any coalition has a contract, which is a plan of exchange. The
summation of endowments and all these trading (barter) contracts is the (current) consumption
bundle for the agent. In the next instant an agent can renew old contracts, or break some of
them to look for a better ones. The procedure is repeated many times, and it may result
in stable barter contracts. Though there are no money and no explicit prices, it turns out
that this stable situation is a usual competitive equilibrium, with uniform rates of exchange
(supporting market prices). The question is whether this equilibrium can be reached through a
converging contractual process under reasonable assumptions. A positive answer would make
the whole concept logically compelling, supplementing, or even replacing the classical views on
“taˆtonnement” and on the generation of market equilibrium.
The results of our analysis show that, under very general assumptions, the contractual processes
may or may not converge to equilibria. A series of examples, where non-convergence is caused
by different reasons, is provided. The most interesting positive results were obtained for so
called “benevolent” processes that converge to equilibrium under reasonable assumptions. It
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is assumed that a coalition or an agent at first searches for new beneficial contracts among
those offers that do not involve breaking other existing contracts. Only when that is impossible
does the agent/coalition initiate new contracts, implying breaking, or decreasing in volume, old
ones (i.e. the proportions of exchange remaining). This assumption requires rather benevolent
and well-informed agents. However it is not too unrealistic to assume careful investigation of
new possibilities before breaking the old contracts. It may also capture the impact of social
institutions generating “trust” and “honesty” in business dealing.
There are some specific processes in microeconomics that appear similar in operation to this
vision, namely “double auctions.” There are also trade environments, like stock and commodity
exchanges, in which agents, as assumed here, adjust price and quantity simultaneously without
an auctioneer. Each agent suggests a volume (lot) to sell or buy and its (ask/bid) price. These
decentralized offers and contracts drive the market. Perhaps this contractual approach can help
clarify our understanding of the dynamics of such systems, thereby finding practical application.
A more ambitious goal is to apply this approach to macroeconomics. Maybe the economy as a
whole operates more like a double auction, than like a classical Walrasian taˆtonnement. Then
the contractual process could better explain the stability or instability of markets, and their
dynamic reaction to shocks, a primary concern of monetary macroeconomics. This approach
could then make a contribution to the government regulation theory.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Q. What are the major issues on which we have not
made progress?
A. Markets and how they actually function; that is,
how they adjust to match demand and supply. We
in economics know a hell of a lot about equilibrium,
but we really don’t know how markets actually get to
equilibrium.
From Interview with Mark Blaug (1998), Challenge,
May–June
Modern models of economy, just as classical ones (Arrow-Debreu model or its simplest version,
a pure exchange economy) are modelling processes of production and allocation of goods and
are based on the concept of competitive equilibrium. At the same time, the proper mechanism
of market functioning (how are prices settled or how do individuals, having chosen preferred
consumption bundles, transit to final resource allocation?) still is not completely clear. In
fact, classical presentation is that equilibrium prices are realized as a result of little by little
permanently going taˆtonnement process, which corrects current prices in accordance with excess
demand law: price for a commodity increases if demand exceeds supply; when supply exceeds
demand price decreases. Economic intuition says us that moving in this manner economic
system as a whole has to find, to grope toward equilibrium prices. Applying mathematical terms
this means that if one describes price change process by differential equation (inclusion), having
in right hand side excess demand, then every solution of this equation converges to equilibrium
prices1. However what is this demand and can we observe it in reality? In mathematical
model by definition demand is the summation of optimal individual solutions in consumer
problems, which are defined by current non-equilibrium prices and by agents’ preferences. How
is it possible to observe demand under non-equilibrium prices, if it is the sum of unrealized
wishes to buy commodity bundles? One can observe the total volume of purchases or the
volume of sellings, supply and its excess, but we think that demand is, evidently, fundamentally
unobservable category.2 Moreover, classical view on prices change in accordance with excess
demand rule is commonly based on a fictitious auctioneer hypothesis. This auctioneer conducts
prices, but he/she is not a revealed economic agent, more likely this is an impersonal being,
realizing a market power.
In the modern literature are also available other approaches, different from classical taˆtonne-
ment, aimed on modelling of dynamics of market processes and the analysis of their convergence
to equilibrium: processes of the prices changes, using Jacobi matrix of excess demand func-
tion (Smale’s approach and other); disequilibrium models of trade (Hahn’s process, Fisher’s
approach and other); Edgeworth’s processes etc. The following section contains an extensive
review of the literature on this theme, where comparative analysis of the approaches and di-
rections is presented. However all approaches have the shortcomings, partially the same as in
Walrasian taˆtonnement (auctioneer and other), partially new, as, for example, high information
requirement of processes with Jacobian and others. So, it allows to make a conclusion: classical
1 This result holds only under additional strong assumptions (gross substitutability and etc.), however up to
this moment it is not important.
2 If one knows supply and excess supply is positive, then demand for a commodity can be calculated, but what
can be done when excess demand is positive?
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 7
and other modern views on the market and laws of its homeostasis are not quite satisfactory
from the modern point of view.
However can we suggest a constructive idea to solve the problem of attainability of economic
equilibria and for better understanding of dynamics of market processes? To answer these ques-
tions we seemingly need to reconsider our views of what really occurs in the market. In our
opinion there are a lot of commodity exchange dealings and for all involved individuals these
dealings are mutually beneficial at the moment of their realization. The current resource alloca-
tion is generated as a summation of all the accomplished dealings and of an initial endowment
allocation.
During a time some new dealings are realized, some of them reiterate there made earlier, other
ones do not (probably this can be treated as a form of the rejection of signed in the past dealings
which are non-beneficial at the moment). It is extremely important, that such “natural” process
of a barter exchange goes itself, there is not here presented neither demand with the supply,
nor prices. The investigation is aimed to formally describe and to study properties of these
processes. Idea of the barter bargain by no means new in theoretical economics (e.g., in Edge-
worth’s views), but it usually appeared as an interpretation, in the form of net trades in a formal
model (see a survey below). Problem however namely in adequate formally-mathematical de-
scription of barter process, allowing an opportunity of a refusal from the bargains (breaking of
the contract).
For formalization of suggested point on market functioning we propose to apply contract based
approach. The formal theory of the contracts starts to be developed from seminal Makarov’s
papers (Makarov, 1980, 1982) and due to Kozyrev’s results (Kozyrev, 1981, 1982) in which a key
idea of partial breaking of the contracts has been offered. Hereinafter the theory of the contracts
was essentially reconsidered and advanced in Marakulin (2003). Contractual approach is closer
to an intuitive imagination on real processes of forming of prices and consumed resources and
to deliver better understanding of cooperative and individual features of agents’ behavior in a
market. In particular, applying contractual approach one can suggest the clearer description
of transition processes to stable (non-dominated) allocations and reveal a specific cooperative
taˆtonnement process, which formally-mathematical description is one of goals of this study.
This cooperative taˆtonnement supposes that coalitions of agents are able to sign new mutually
beneficial contracts (exchange commodity dealings) and also each agent can partially break
contracts signed in the past if it is beneficial for him. The process of the signing of new and
breaking of old contracts is going in simultaneous regime (although, it is possible to consider
the separate version), and is extended over time. The last means, that in fact process deals
with momentary contracts, which together with signed in the past define the process derivative.
Formally contractual process can be described via differential inclusion x˙(t) ∈ F (x), where x(t)
is current allocation of resources. The right hand side of this inclusion is formed via mutually
beneficial contracts for various coalitions where abilities of singleton coalitions are realized by
means of partial breaking of contracts.
All feasible solutions of this inclusion form a set of feasible contractual trajectories, which can
or cannot converge to (potentially) final allocations. It is known from the theory of contracts
(Marakulin, 2003) that under some assumptions (interior point, differentiable concave utilities)
every proper contractual allocation (this is an allocation which can be realized by a web of
contracts stable relative to the signing of new contracts and relative to partial breaking of old
ones) is equilibrium allocation. The converse implication is always true: every equilibrium
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can be presented as a proper contractual allocation. Thus equilibria and only they (under
assumptions) are stationary points for cooperative proper contractual taˆtonnement. However
up to this moment it is unknown when this process, starting at initial endowments, is converging
and which stationary points are stable. Exactly the investigation of convergency of contractual
processes and related questions is the main goal of this project.
The main difficulties of our study, as for determination and so for stating of process convergence,
are caused by an opportunity of the individuals partially to break contracts (because along a
trajectory utilities may change non-monotonically), however it reflects the substance of market
processes and otherwise equilibrium relative to initial endowments cannot be attained. It is
also to analyze stability of equilibria, but the form of stability actually depends on the type
of processes and it may differ for classical and cooperative taˆtonnement. Interesting their
comparison, and it is possible, that there are equilibria which are stable in one sense but
unstable in another one. As a whole the analysis of convergence and stability of process also
seems to be a necessary step coming into being the theory of barter contracts, this is important
for economic theory and rather complicated problem.
2. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON EQUILIBRIUM
STABILITY
There is a vast economic literature, devoted to the research of processes driving a multiproduct
economy to competitive equilibrium. By now one can mark out at least five approaches to
explain market dynamics, they have own comparative advantages and shortcomings. These
approaches are:
(i) Taˆtonnement processes of equilibrium prices of Walrasian3 type. This is taˆtonnement,
where a current disequilibrium prices change by the law of excess demand: if it is positive
the price increases if negative then price decreases.
(ii) Processes, in which the law of change of prices is defined due to Jacobi matrix (differential)
of excess demand function. The first process of this type was suggested in Smale (1981).
(iii) Disequilibrium models of trade processes among consumers; among them Hahn–Negishi
process (Hahn, Negishi, 1962) and Edgeworth processes by Uzawa (Uzawa, 1962).
(iv) Edgeworth processes. They are the processes of commodity exchange without prices,
they are based on a mutually beneficial barter (irrevocable) among the members of any
coalition of consumers. As time elapsed the coalitions of agents participated in exchange
may vary and run some class of permitted coalitions (some coalitions can be forbidden,
may be because of that the formation of them is incredible from the essential point of
view and exchanges are not realized).
(v) Strategic approach, where equilibrium and competition are examined from purely game
theoretical point of view.
Below we consider the specified approaches in more details in (limited) frameworks of well-
known Arrow–Debreu type economy of pure exchange. For convenience of an exposition we
3 In this process market prices on different goods are changed simultaneously, this is a modification of original
Walrasian idea suggested in Samuelson (1941).
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begin with formal descriptions of model, introduction of notations and reminder of concepts
and notions.
Let us consider a typical exchange economy in which E = Rl denotes the space of commodities
(l is the number of commodities). Let I = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents (traders or consumers).
A consumer i ∈ I is characterized by a consumption set Xi = E+ = Rl+, an initial endow-
ments ωi ∈ Xi, and a preference relation described by a utility function ui : Xi → R, where
ui(xi) > ui(yi) means that agent i strictly prefers a bundle xi to yi. This may be also standardly
denoted as xi i yi. So, the pure exchange model under study may be represented as a triplet:
E = 〈 I, E, (Xi, ui(·), ωi)i∈I 〉.
A pair of vectors (x, p), x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
∏
I Xi, p ∈ Rl, is said to be a Walrasian or
competitive equilibrium of model E , if the price vector p 6= 0 and the following conditions are
satisfied:
(i) ∀ i ∈ I, pxi ≤ pωi & ∀ yi ∈ Xi, yi i xi ⇒ pyi > pωi;
(ii)
∑
i∈I xi =
∑
i∈I ωi.
Condition (i) says that for each i the bundle xi is an optimal budget-admissible consumption
plan, while (ii) means that these plans can be jointly realized (all markets are balanced).
Traditionally the concept of competitive equilibrium usually express in the terms of equality
between demand and supply or simply as the equality to zero of excess demand.
Individual demand di(p) of agent i for prices p = (p1, . . . , pl) 6= 0 is the solution of utility
maximization problem
ui(y)→ max, subject to py ≤ pωi, y ∈ Xi.
If p  0 this problem always has a solution and therefore the map di(·) is well defined on
Rl++. Together with individual demand it is sometimes convenient to consider individual excess
demand function, determined by formula zi(p) = di(p)− ωi.
In a context of assumptions for Arrow-Debreu model the map (function) of excess demand for
a given prices is defined as a sum of individual solutions of consumer problems for all agents of
economy (total demand) minus the total supply. In such a way the vector D(p) =
∑
I d
i(p) is
called total or aggregated demand. As soon as in a context of exchange model supply is fixed
and equal to ω¯ =
∑
I ωi, then excess demand under the prices p is
Z(p) = D(p)− ω¯ =
∑
I
di(p)−
∑
I
ωi =
∑
I
zi(p).
Obviously, the maps of demand and excess demand are correctly defined on area of change of
the prices Rl++. Moreover, a vector p 0 is the prices of equilibrium if and only if Z(p) = 0 (or,
equivalently, Z(p) ≤ 0). In general, the excess demand map can be a point-to-set mapping,4
however for simplicity we shall assume below that demand is single-valued.5
Besides under the natural model assumptions (classical convex, continuous preferences) function
Z(·) is continuous on its domain Rl++. Moreover, where it is necessary, we shall assume without
4 For example, in Polterovich, Spivak (1982) it was investigated convergence to equilibrium of Walrasian
processes and its stability under point-to-set excess demand mapping.
5 It is provided by strictly quasi-concave utilities.
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special mentioning that it is differentiable in a proper degree. By construction, the function of
excess demand Z(p) is homogeneous of degree 0 and satisfies to Walras law6: 〈p, Z(p)〉 = 0,
∀ p  0. For the existence of equilibrium and also to provide the convergence of a number of
processes of price changes to equilibrium, in addition it is usually assumed boundary conditions.
The basic example of this kind condition is the following: if pm → p0 ∈ ∂Rl+, p0 6= 0 for m→∞,
then Zj(p
m)→ +∞ for p0j = 0, j = 1, . . . , l. In the limits of this section we always shall think
that it is true everywhere, where it is necessary.
Further we proceed to the direct description of specified above processes and results.
2.1. Walrasian taˆtonnement process of equilibrium prices
There is the vast literature, devoted to the study of this type processes, now we note only two
reviews Hahn (1982), Polterovich, Spivak (1982), where one can find the detailed description
of problems and results. Further first of all we describe process formally. The economy is
described in most aggregated form via to excess demand function Z : p→ Z(p), defined for all
positive prices p 0, p ∈ Rl.
In a general case ‘taˆtonnement’ is described as a process of prices p(t) = (pj(t))j=1,...,l, t ≥ 0
changes, as the solution of the following system of the differential equations:
p˙j(t) = F
j(Zj(p)), j = 1, . . . , l. (2.1)
Here it is always assumed that all functions F j(·) are sign-preserving, i.e., we have
Zj(p)F
j(Zj(p)) > 0 ⇐⇒ Zj(p) 6= 0. Exactly this property of right hand side of (2.1)
implies that the price of j-th commodity adjust in the same direction as excess demand for
that commodity: it increases when excess demand is positive and vice versa. It is commonly
assumed in addition (Hahn, 1982) that d
dx
F j(x) > 0 for points from an appropriate area for
process (2.1). It is known (Hahn, 1982) that the solution of our system exists and is unique for
every initial data p(0) 0. In classical taˆtonnement it is presumed a simplest form of functions
F j(Zj(p)) = Zj(p), i.e., in classic approach F
j(·) is identity map of real numbers into itself. In
this case the system of differential equations (2.1) turns into p˙ = Z(p). There are also consid-
ered some “intermediate” variants where, for example, it is supposed F j(Zj(p)) = kjZj(p) for
some real kj > 0, j = 1, . . . , l.
Essential treatment of taˆtonnement process (2.1) is commonly based on a hypothesis of fictitious
auctioneer, which, likely as it occurs in real auctions, raises the price when demand exceeds
supply and, accordingly, reduces price, if the demand is less than supply. An auctioneer is not
revealed in model (Arrow-Debreu type) economic agent, this is some impersonal being, whose
actions reflects an invisible hand of the market. It is not quite clear in fact how the markets
really work in a disequilibrium situation, during to search of equilibrium, because there are no
presented revealed microeconomic models of process and of agents’ behavior out of equilibrium.
In the literature a hypothesis about the existence of auctioneer and similar constructions are
criticized and are recognized as unrealistic, for example, see Kreps (1990) p. 195–198; Fisher
(1983), p. 19–26. Fisher (Fisher, 1983) have noted the following difficulties in the process
(2.1) interpretation: First, “... It has nothing to do with the question of whether or not trade,
consumption, or production takes place out of equilibrium” (actually, exchange is possible only
when equilibrium is attained!). Second, “...we know very little about how individuals do or
6 For Arrow–Debreu model it is provided due to local non-satiated preferences.
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ought to behave when equilibrium is not presented; hence, the resort to an aggregate equation”.
Finally, “... in the unrealistic world of no trading out of equilibrium ... individuals take action
to make their excess demand effective. ... they can take such action which ... implies that they
have something of value which they can and do sell so as to have something to offer when they
buy...” So, out of equilibrium individuals have to buy and sell to reveal their excess demand,
for the price changes to be going, but actually they can do it only under equilibrium prices.
Summarizing, one can conclude that equilibrium theory needs an adequate dynamic theory, in
which framework the process of equilibrium prices searching has to be revealed.
The subject of criticism is also rather rigorous conditions, under which one can guarantee the
convergence of process (2.1) to equilibrium. Results on convergence and stability of process
(2.1) mainly are based on the property of gross substitutability of excess demand functions, in
various forms of generality, or just on the axiom of revealed preferences and others. Let us
consider these assumptions in more details, see Mas-Colell, et al. (1995).
• A function7 Z(·) has the property of gross substitutability (GS–property), if for any prices
p′ and p such that p′m > pm is true for some m and p
′
k = pk for k 6= m, then Zk(p′) > Zk(p)
takes place for all k 6= m, k = 1, . . . , l.
For a differentiable function Z(·) the condition of gross substitutability takes the form
∂Zk(p)/∂pm > 0, ∀ p 0, ∀ k 6= m.
• An excess demand function Z(·) satisfies to weak axiom (WARP) of revealed preference,
if for any couple of vector-prices, p and p′,
Z(p) 6= Z(p′) & pZ(p′) ≤ 0 ⇒ p′Z(p) > 0
takes place.
Being applied to (aggregated) excess demand function, the properties of gross substitutability
and (weak) revealed preference are, in general, non-equivalent and rather strong requirements.
However both of them have common important corollaries:
(i) The set of equilibrium prices is convex.
(ii) If p∗ is equilibrium price, then p∗Z(p) > 0 for all p 0 which are not proportional to p∗.
In particular, property (ii) allows easily to understand why process (2.1) is converged, if one
of the specified conditions is carried out. Really, in the simplest case of (2.1), when p˙ = Z(p),
it is enough to differentiate by t the function of squared Euclidean distance between a current
prices and equilibrium prices, ||p(t) − p∗||2 = ∑lj=1(pj(t) − p∗j)2. By virtue of Walras law, we
obviously have d
dt
||p(t) − p∗||2 = 2(p(t) − p∗)p˙ = −2p∗Z(p) < 0. So, we see that the distance
between a current vector of prices and equilibrium ones decreases when time is going.
Finally we would like to mention one more classical condition, providing the local conver-
gence of taˆtonnement process, this is the property of diagonal domination of Jacobi matrix
DpZ
−(p∗) = A, without the last row and column, of excess demand function Z(p) in a point of
equilibrium p∗. Formally, diagonal domination means
∃h = (h1, . . . , hl−1) ≥ 0 : ∀ j hjajj < −
∑
k 6=j
hk|ajk|.
7 In a context of an exchange model the gross substitutability of excess demand function and demand function
are equivalent.
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Gross substitutability implies this property, but the opposite is false. Moreover, in literature
there are not known other examples of diagonal domination. The diagonal domination and
other similar requirements, e.g., see Theorem 1.7 in Hahn (1982), implies that eigenvalues of A
have negative real parts and this provides the local stability of price adjustment process.
2.2. Processes of the prices change, using Jacobi matrix of excess
demand function
First of all we would like to notice, that a large part of the critical remarks, made relative to
Walrasian processes, can be also addressed to the processes of this type.
Smale (Smale, 1976) investigated the convergence of prices changes process, based on (global)
Newton method,8 which is usually applied to find a solution of system of the nonlinear equations.
The process is determined as:
[DpZ
−(p)]p˙ = −λ(p)Z−(p). (2.2)
Here Z−(p) is excess demand for all goods excepting (for example) the last one, and DpZ
−(p) is
Jacobi matrix of excess demand function, excepting the last row and column.9 It is supposed,
that the sign of functions λ(p), entering as a factor in the right part of (2.2),10 coincides with
the sign of (−1)l−1det[DpZ−(p)]. If DpZ−(p) is non-singular matrix in the domain of p changes,
then process (2.2) can be rewritten in an explicit form
p˙ = −λ(p)[DpZ−(p)]−1Z−(p).
Smale (Smale, 1976) proved, that this process converges to equilibrium for any aggregated
excess demand function,11 if the initial prices p(0) 6= 0 are on the boundary of Rl+ (area of
prices change), except for a set of zero measure (with the account of normalization), and under
additional requirement that DpZ
−(p) is non-singular in effective area of prices change (these are
positive and normalized by the last component). Certainly, this is remarkable result, however
its weak side is too large informational requirements. Really, at each time moment the process
of prices change requires a knowledge not only excess demand, but also Jacobi matrix, i.e.,
the change of price in the market explicitly depends on how the prices on other markets are
changed.
Kamiya (Kamiya, 1990), developed Smale’s approach, and has offered process, defined as
[
DpZ
−(p)
||DpZ−(p)|| −
I
||p− p(0)||
]
p˙ = −λ(p)Z−(p). (2.3)
Here, as well as in Smale’s process, DpZ
−(p) is Jacobi matrix of excess demand without the last
column and row, p(t) is (l−1)-dimensional vector-function of the prices without last component
8 For the first time the method was offered and partially investigated in Arrow, Hahn (1991).
9 To the last row and column there corresponds a commodity, which is used as a numeraire good. The elimination
of a row and column is necessary, to allocate square nonsingular submatrix in J [Z(p)]; since excess demand is
homogeneous, J [Z(p)]p = 0 and, therefore, matrix J [(p)] is always singular.
10 Certainly, it is necessary also to postulate other properties of λ(p), ensuring existence and uniqueness of
solution (2.2).
11 Here the economy completely is set by function Z(p).
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pl(t), such that ||p(t)|| ≤ 1 and p(0) is an initial vector of the prices of the same dimension. It is
assumed the sign of real-valued function λ(p), placed in the right part of (2.3), is opposite to the
sign of the determinant of matrix, entered in the left part of (2.3), i.e., the sign coincides with
the sign of det
[
I
||p−p(0)||
− DpZ−(p)
||DpZ−(p)||
]
. Using methods, suggested by Smale, Kamiya (Kamiya,
1990) proves, that the process (2.3) converges to equilibrium for almost all initial data p(0)
from the interior of Rl−1+ .
Mukherji (Mukherji, 1995) investigated another process, using Jacobi matrix of aggregated
excess demand function:
p˙ = −J [Z(p)]tZ(p). (2.4)
He has shown in Mukherji (1995), that the process (2.4) belongs to a group of so-called locally
effective processes (LEPM): the processes of this type converge to any (regular12) equilibrium
locally (i.e. for the equilibrium prices there exists a neighborhood, such that if p(0) in the
neighborhood, the process converges to the equilibrium).
Concerning all described above processes, and also other processes from this group,13 it is
possible to state one common remark: all of them require too much information. Moreover,
Saari and Simon (Saari, Simon, 1978) have proved, that this is unavoidable property of any
LEPM-process, i.e., actually, it is necessary condition for the process to be locally effective
for (almost) any function of aggregated excess demand. In relationship we would like to recall
Sonnenschein-Debreu-Mantel results, see survey Shaher, Sonnenschein (1982), about represen-
tation of a general aggregated excess demand function as an excess demand function for Arrow-
Debreu model. They show, that any continuous, homogeneous and obeying Walras law function
allows representation in the specified for Arrow-Debreu model form, the model where number
of the agents is equal to the number of commodities. In so doing the utilities of individuals may
be classical: continuous, strictly concave, monotonous and, moreover, homogeneous (degree 1).
Thus, one can go to the following conclusion: any locally effective mechanism of prices change
based on excess demand function for Arrow-Debreu model is informational requiring and, with
necessity, has to use (whole!) Jacobi matrix J [Z(p)] of excess demand. In particular, making
comments to Smale’s process, Hahn (Hahn, 1982, p. 767) replies: “Obviously these results are
interesting as algorithms and not as models of invisible hand.”
2.3. Disequilibrium models of trade processes
There are at least two disequilibrium processes known in literature in a context of a pure
exchange model, see Fisher (1983), Mukherji (2003). These are Edgeworth process by Uzawa
(Uzawa, 1962), and Hahn’s process (Hahn, Negishi, 1962), so-named in Negishi (1962). It
is common feature of both processes, that endowments are varied at the time, i.e., initial
endowments ω = (ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn) ∈ Rln+ is the function of time, ω : [0, +∞) → Rln+ (n is the
number of agents). As well as in Walrasian processes (taˆtonnement), real consumption comes
only at the end of the process, where it is described by a limiting point of ω(·). Further we
consider other specific features of processes.
Common properties. The prices change according to excess demand:
12 Jacobi matrix of excess demand at equilibrium point has the maximal rank equal to l − 1.
13 For example, for orthogonal Newton process, described in Jordan (1983).
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p˙j(t) =
{
F j(Zj(p, ω(t))), unless pj = 0 & Zj(p) < 0;
0, if pj = 0 & Zj(p) < 0.
(2.5)
Here the functions F j(·) satisfy to the usual requirements: continuity and sign-preservation.
There is postulated a law of change of the initial endowments, which can be also treated as
(current) allocation of consumed resources ω : [0, +∞) → Rln+ , and this map has to obey the
requirements:
∀ i ∈ I, ω˙i(t) = gi(p(t), ω(t))− ωi(t),
n∑
i=1
ωi(t) =
n∑
i=1
ωi(0), ∀ t ∈ [0, +∞), (2.6)
where all functions gi(p(t), ω(t)) are assumed to be continuous and, in addition, to satisfy to
“No Swindling” condition:
∀ i ∈ I, p(t)ω˙i(t) = 0 ⇐⇒ p(t)gi(p(t), ω(t)) = p(t)ωi(t), ∀ t ≥ 0. (2.7)
Essentially, in both processes the functions gi(p(t), ω(t)), i ∈ I set a rule of trade (trading or
transaction rule). Other requirements in processes differ.
Hahn’s process. A specific requirement is the assumption that markets are orderly: ∀ t ≥ 0
zij(p(t), ωi(t))Zj(p(t), ωi(t)) > 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , l, (2.8)
unless the case zij(p(t), ωi(t)) = 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Here z
i
j(p(t), ωi(t)) is individual excess
demand of i’s agent for the commodity j under current prices and endowments ωi(t). This
requirement means, that if the market of a product j is not balanced, then all agents have
positive excess demand or supply (there are hence only unsatisfied demanders or suppliers for
any given good).
Edgeworth’s process by Uzawa. It is supposed, that endowments (here it is a current consump-
tion) are changing so that monotonous growth of utility of each individual goes, at least for one
in strictly form, if it is possible in general; everything under constrains (2.6), (2.7). Formally
it is defined as: ∀ t ≥ 0
ui[gi(p(t), ω(t))] ≥ ui[ωi(t)], ∀ i, (2.9)
ui[gi(p(t), ω(t))] = ui[ωi(t)], ∀ i ⇐⇒ gi(p(t), ω(t)) = ωi(t), ∀ i &
∀ (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rln+ : p(t)xi = p(t)ωi(t) ∀ i &
∑
xi =
∑
ωi(t),
∃ k : uk(xk) > uk(ωk(t)) ⇒ ∃ i : ui(xi) < ui(ωi(t)).
Thus, at each current moment of time, a state of economy changes if and only if it appears
possible mutually beneficial exchange within the framework of budget constrains.14
Both described processes (Hahn’s process and Edgeworth’s process by Uzawa) are converged to
some Pareto optimal allocation under more or less standard assumptions, including boundary
condition (provides a movement of a trajectory in Rln++), and additional assumption about
14 Uzawa also assumes, that functions gi(·), determining barter process along a trajectory, take values equal
to the demand of individuals, if aggregated demand is equal to supply (price of equilibrium for current initial
endowments). I did not identify a place where we need it. In my opinion this is excessive assumption, though
I cannot disagree with it.
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 15
strict concavity of utility functions, see Hahn, Negishi (1962), Uzawa (1962). In so doing price
processes are also converged (for Edgeworth’s process by Uzawa see Mukherji, 1974, 2003) and
the limiting prices are the prices of equilibrium for the given limiting resources allocation (here
this is initial and final allocation simultaneously), this is a situation of no-trade.
The detailed description of specified disequilibrium processes one can find in Arrow, Hahn
(1991) (part 13), Hahn (1982), Fisher (1983), Mukherji (2003), where their criticism is also
contained. For example, Fisher (Fisher, 1983), being an advocate of Hahn’s process, criticized
Edgeworth’s process by Uzawa in the following way. First, it is not clear, why Pareto improving
trade actually will takes place whenever such a situation arises. The reason is that it is possible
that all coalitions of the agents, capable to do such mutually beneficial exchange, can have
too large size, and small coalitions (bilateral or trilateral or quadrilateral trade and so on) are
unable to carry out Pareto-improving exchange. Admitting an opportunity of exchange in the
huge coalitions, we impose “very heavy requirements on the dissemination of information and
to assume away the costs of coalition formation.” Moreover, the inclusion into model of money
as means of exchange, actually does not change a situation. Second, Edgeworth’s processes do
not admit a revealed opportunity of production and consumption in nonequilibrium situations,
now it is still open quest.15 Third, the assumption, that a trade takes place only when the
utilities of individuals are increasing, is not as harmless as it seems. In a true nonequilibrium
world the individuals “trade even then there is no direct utility (or profit) gain from so doing
because they wish to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities, speculating on their ability
later to retrade at more advantage prices.” Moreover, Fisher writes: “Yet a crucial aim of
stability theory must be to examine the question of whether arbitrage drives a competitive
economy to equilibrium.”
On the other hand, Hahn’s process does not avoided shortcomings. One of them is that be-
fore purchasing something, one needs to sell something. Therefore many of the potentially
interesting bargains may be not realized. In order to solve this problem, Arrow and Hahn
(Arrow, Hahn, 1991) directly introduced money into model, using it as the intermediary-goods
in any barter bargain, and imposed other additional assumptions. Mukherji (Mukherji, 2003)
also criticizes Hahn’s process and specifies a main its shortcoming: the absence of revealed
voluntary nature of barter bargains in process.
Really, if there is no specific model, explaining in an microeconomic way how and why (non-
mutually beneficial) barter bargain is realized, voluntary can be understood only as a condition,
attracting monotonous growth of utility of the individuals along trajectory, i.e., realizing bar-
gain all its participants should win.
Finally, both processes are indirectly based on a hypothesis of auctioneer, since due to definitions
they satisfy (2.5).
2.4. Edgeworth’s processes
We call so the processes of change of current resources allocation, described in continuous or
discrete time, which are going without prices and, accordingly, there are no budget constrains.
Essentially the processes of this type are close to contractual processes without breaking of the
15 Hahn (Hahn, 1982) notes the work of Hurwicz–Radner–Reiter (Hurwicz, et al., 1978), in which the process is
considered in a stochastic context and, moreover, there is also shown that the production can be incorporated
into model.
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contracts, see Hahn (1982) p. 772–777, and also following section. The basic sense of process
is, that the process generates a trajectory in space of allocations such that along trajectory
there is the monotonous growth of individual utilities, and at least for one strictly, if a current
point still is not Pareto optimum. A process of this type can be set, for example, via a rule of
trade, described by functions gi(ω(t)), i ∈ I, similarly as it was made in the previous paragraph
(however here there are no prices): ω : [0, +∞)→ Rln+ ,
∀ i ∈ I, ω˙i(t) = gi(ω(t))− ωi(t),
n∑
i=1
ωi(t) =
n∑
i=1
ωi(0), ∀ t ∈ [0, +∞).
The functions gi(·) are continuous and satisfy to conditions (2.9), with the exception of budget
constrains.16 It is simply to prove that every limiting point of such process is Pareto optimal.17
There is a number of papers where Edgeworth’s processes are considered in stochastic context
(see review Hahn, 1982; and also Hurwicz, et al., 1978, Graham, Weintraub, 1975), where, in our
terms, on the set of all mutually beneficial contracts some reasonable probability distribution is
defined. The appropriate stochastic process converges to an Pareto optimum with probability
1 (we omit other specific features and assumptions).
There are also papers, in which Pareto boundary is attained by the efforts of coalitions of
limited size (agents are not more than number commodities). The first result of this type was
received in Polterovich (1970), see also Feldman (1973), Graham, et al. (1976), Madden (1975),
Green (1974). However, in so doing each active in barter process coalition carries out transition
on intra-coalitional Pareto boundary (relative to current allocation) and all permissible coali-
tions are incorporated in a cycle, which is repeated infinite times (compare with (2.9)). Thus,
essentially these processes are discrete in time.
There are also papers, in which the transition to core allocations are realized, see Green (1974).
Here a stochastic context is also available, where the reaction of current blocking coalition
replenishes with the reaction of supplementing coalition, that forms the transition from a current
allocation in subsequent one. In such a way an allocation from core (if necessary the procedure
is repeated infinitely) is attained with probability 1.
Easily to see, that in all of these directions is available contractual context and, moreover, the
contract based language is simpler, more convenient and it can be better interpreted.
2.5. Strategic approach
This direction began to develop in the economic theory from the middle of 80’s of last century
and was aimed to clarify the basic hypotheses of competitive equilibrium theory in a context
16 This assumption is important for the process converges to Pareto optimum. Hahn in Hahn (1982) p. 773,
gives another description of process, requiring only a growth of utilities without restrictions on the derivative
of process. Such process can be finished at an “irredundant” point, which is not Pareto optimal, an elementary
example can be constructed: Let α : [0,+∞) → [0, 1], supp (α) = [0,∞), ∫∞
0
α(t)dt = 1 (one can take
α(t) = 1(1+t)2 ,
∫ t
0
α(s)ds = 1− 1(1+t) ) and let v be a mutually beneficial contract such that ui(xi + λvi) strictly
increases in λ ∈ [0, 1], ∀ i ∈ supp (v), but z∗ = x + v is not Pareto optimum. Then a trajectory of process
z(t) = x + v
∫ t
0
α(s)ds obeys all Hahn’s conditions and z(t)→ x + v for t→ +∞.
17 We can not give exact reference, but it seems that this (elementary) fact was clear to economists for a long
time ago, and Uzawa is one of them.
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of a strategic game.18 An idea was to apply game theoretical methods to give the answers on
such questions as: whence the prices are undertaken and who them defines, why the agents
should accept the prices as given and why they cannot change them (a consumer is said to
be a “price-taker”), that is equilibrium and perfect competition? The answers on these and
other important theoretical questions are given in the analysis of some game in extensive form.
These games belongs to a class of DMBG-games (dynamical matching and bargaining games),
constructed by a model of economy in a special way. For lack of an opportunity to enter in
detailed explanations, we specify only two sources of the literature: Gale (2000), Kunimoto,
Serrano (2004) and we describe only the basic idea of the approach19 in a context of one possible
game model.
In economy there is a continuum of agents, presented by a finite number of types. Each type is
characterized by initial endowments vector and by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
Commodities are infinite divisible, time is discrete and is indexed by the natural numbers. At
each time period each agent can meet the partner with some fixed probability. If some pair
{i, k} of the agents has met, then, after the identification of type and current consumptions, xi
and xk, with equal probability one of them is selected, say i, to propose a vector of goods z ∈ Rl
(makes the offer), to be transferred to him from his opponent k. If the agent k accepts the offer,
her/his consumption bundle changes on xk− z, and the partner’s one becomes xi + z (only the
allowable offers are under consideration, they are not to allow consumption bundles to leave
the limits of consumption sets).20 If the agent does not accept the offer, the consumptions
do not change. The individual, who does not accept the offer made to him, can leave the
market at next time moment, no other individual (accepting the offer or not participating in
the given round) can leave market. An agent, who never leaves market, receives utility equal
to −∞ (thus, the consumption is possible only after leaving). A player’s strategy is a plan the
prescribes her/his bargaining behavior in different trade situations for each period, depending
on current consumption, type of partner, her/his current consumption and, the offer made by
him (if so happen). The strategy of the agent depends on the realized (by him) earlier bargains
and, if to him the offer is made, it may takes values: “accept the offer”, “reject and stay”,
“reject and exit”.
It is supposed, that the agents of one type use common strategy. However, in view of the
previous acts of trade, the different agents can have different current consumption bundles, but
for each type only a finite number. Further, for constructed DMBG-game a concept market
equilibrium is introduced, which is in fact a specialized kind of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
and in discrete (equivalent) variant of game is presented as a sequential equilibrium. The basic
result is the theorem, which states that in every market equilibrium each player leaves the
market with probability 1, when her/his consumption bundle is equal to a bundle kept him in
Walrasian equilibrium.
In spite of the fact that the methods of strategic approach are essentially different from con-
tractual approach, we have found necessary to describe this direction, because it is aimed to
solve similar problems of equilibrium theory, which are related with the validity and possibility
to be correctly realize basic theoretical hypotheses. In our opinion, the most attractive part
18 It is also called as a game in normal form.
19 Apparently, it was Douglas Gale’s idea, but it seems that it is a suitable adaptation and development of ideas
of previous researchers, see Gale (2000).
20 In our terminology the offer z is an offer to sign the barter contract (z,−z).
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of strategic approach is the clear description of what and how the individuals make trades in
uncertain market circumstances.
3. DYNAMICAL CONTRACTUAL PROCESS AS COOPERATIVE
TAˆTONNEMENT
We begin with description of contractual economy and main contract based concepts in an ap-
propriate form of generality. Further the basis of dynamical contractual processes is described.
3.1. Main concepts of contractual economy
Let us consider a typical exchange economy, described in section 2 and presented as a triplet:
E = 〈 I, E, (Xi, ui(·), ωi)i∈I 〉.
Let us denote by L = En the space of economy allocations, let ω = (ωi)i∈I be the vector of
initial endowments of all traders of the economy. Denote X =
∏
i∈I Xi and define
A(X) = {x = (xi)i∈I ∈ X |
∑
i∈I
xi =
∑
i∈I
ωi},
the set of all feasible allocations in E .
Everywhere below we shall assume that model E satisfies the following smoothness assumption
(S).
(S) All utilities ui(·) are concave and twice continuously differentiable functions, such that
∀xi ∈ Xi = Rl+, ∀ i ∈ I, ∇ui(xi) 6= 0 and matrices ∇2ui(xi) are negative definite.
Further we shortly recall different contractual concepts, see Marakulin (2003).
By the formal definition, any reallocation of commodities v = (vi)i∈I ∈ L, where vi ∈ E, i ∈ I,
i.e., any vector v ∈ L satisfying ∑ vi = 0, is called a (barter) contract. In this project context
we assume that every contract is permissible.
A finite collection V of permissible contracts is called a web of contracts relative to y ∈ A(X) if
y +
∑
v∈U
v ∈ X ∀U ⊂ V.
A web of contracts V relative to ω is called a web of contracts or simply a web. Note that
V = ∅ is a web relative to every y ∈ A(X). Notation x(V ) = ω + ∑v∈U v denotes the feasible
allocation sustained by V relative to ω. For any contract v ∈ V , let us set
S(v) = supp (v) = {i ∈ I | vi 6= 0}.
the support of the contract v. It is assumed that contract v ∈ V may be broken by any trader
in S(v), since he/she simply may not keep his/her contractual obligations. Also a non-empty
group (coalition) of consumers can sign any number of new contracts. Being applied jointly,
i.e., as a simultaneous procedure, these operations allow coalition T ⊆ I to yield new webs of
contracts. The set of all such webs is denoted by F (V, T ). It is required formally that each
element U ∈ F (V, T ) has to satisfy the following properties:
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(i) v ∈ V \ U ⇒ S(v) ∩ T 6= ∅,
(ii) v ∈ U \ V ⇒ S(v) ⊂ T .
Condition (i) means that only members of T can break contracts in V , condition (ii) means
that only members of T may sign new contracts.
In contract-based approach the notion of domination via a coalition is extended onto webs of
contracts. This property of domination via coalition T ⊆ I, being written as U 
T
V (read: U
dominates V via coalition T ), means that
(i) U ∈ F (V, T ),
(ii) xi(U)
i
xi(V ) for all i ∈ T .
A web of contracts V is called stable if there is no web U and no coalition T ⊆ I, T 6= ∅ such
that U 
T
V .
A web of contracts V is called lower stable if there is no web U and no coalition T ⊆ I, T 6= ∅
such that U 
T
V and U ⊆ V .
A web of contracts V is called upper stable if there is no web U and no coalition T ⊆ I, T 6= ∅
such that U 
T
V and V ⊆ U .
An allocation x is called contractual (lower, upper contractual) if x = x(V ) for a stable (lower,
upper stable) web V .
It can be directly deduce from definitions that in any standard market every core allocation
allows an alternative description as contractual one; accordingly, Pareto optimal allocations
correspond to upper contractual ones, and individual rational allocations are lower contractual
ones etc. The concept of proper contractual allocation is also important, this concept realizes
(assumptions: interior point, smooth preferences) an alternative description of equilibria.
The notion of proper contractual allocation is introduced due to the following construction.
First let us introduce an equivalence relation on the set of all lower stable webs, this equivalence
will allow us to partially divide contracts. To this end, let us define a partial ordering on the
set of all webs as follows:
U ≥ V ⇐⇒ ∃ a map onto f : U → V, such that
(i) λf(u) = u for some 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and for every u ∈ U ,
(ii)
∑
u∈f−1(v) u = v for every v ∈ V .
Thus, a relation U ≥ V simply means, that contracts from U are produced from the contracts
from V due to partition into several contracts (decomposition in a sum) under condition of
preservation of exchange proportions and volumes of exchanged commodities.21
Now the equivalence relation may be defined as follows:
U ' V ⇐⇒ ∃ a web W such that V ≥ W & U ≥ W.
Definition 3.1. An allocation x is called proper contractual if there exits a web V such that
x = x(V ) and for every U ' V the allocation x = x(U) is contractual.
21 A value f(u) ∈ V specifies the contract, a share of which is u ∈ U .
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The economic meaning of proper contractual stability of an allocation is, that we allow the
agents not only to sign new contracts but also to partially break contracts if exchange propor-
tions remain constant. This extends agents’ operating potentialities and approaches contractual
processes to market processes under perfect competition conditions. In Kozyrev (1981, 1982),
Kozyrev stated (see also Marakulin, 2003) that under some technical assumptions all proper
contractual allocations are equilibria.
Further let us turn to the main subject of project. We suggest to investigate the stability of
trajectories which correspond to the proper contractual behavior of traders. However before
we would like to specify one possible interpretation of proper-contractual behavior, driving
economy to proper-contractual allocations.
Suppose that an economy is not static and lives during long-duration interval of time. As
time elapsed individuals sign the rather short-term contracts on an exchange of commodities.
The contract assumes mutual deliveries of goods among agents and, after its execution, an
opportunity of renewal, i.e., the same contract can be signed again, but now it is realized during
another time period. The agents can agree with contract’s renewal (prolongation) or disagree,
first studying an opportunity to prolong contract in smaller volumes. Thus, instead of breaking
of the contract, even if partial, for economy in dynamics living a long time period one can speak
about renewal and non-renewal of the contracts. Notice, that if resources are renewed then
according to this interpretation agents can consume goods as time goes on, notwithstanding
the fact that current situation is a disequilibrium one. It seems natural to assume that stable
in time contracts, i.e., regularly renewed contracts have to take out economy to equilibrium
performance (there is no production!). However the convergence to such state is not clear and
requires the careful research.
We believe that suggested description of economic exchange processes — due to rules of proper-
contractual behavior — essentially closer to intuitive representations about their character in
real economic environment in comparison with processes considered in items (i)–(iv) of the
previous section.
3.2. On the definition of contractual trajectory
Formally, a trajectory is a map x(·), operating from [0, +∞) into the set of all feasible alloca-
tions, i.e., into A(X),
x(·) : [0, +∞)→ A(X).
Here the vector x(t) = (xi(t))I is a feasible bundle of consumption plans, realized at the moment
t ≥ 0. It is presumed that t = 0 is the initial time point, the process ‘starts’ at this point from
initial endowments allocation, i.e., we set x(0) = ω.
We are interested in not arbitrary trajectories of this type, but trajectories which can be
realized during contractual processes via commodity exchange among agents. Presume ∆t > 0
is the time period during which a contract v is realized, and presume that other exchange
operations with commodities (the signing of new contracts or the breaking of existing ones)
were not realized. Then at the moment t′ = t + ∆t trajectory takes value x(t′) = x(t) + v,
wherefore v = x(t′) − x(t). As soon as other contractual operations in interval [t, t′] were not
conducted, one may think that at the point t′′ = λt′ + (1− λ)t, λ ∈ [0, 1] the trajectory value
is produced from values of end points, which are mixed in the same proportions, i.e., one can
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 21
postulate x(t′′) = λx(t′)+ (1−λ)x(t).22 This can be rewritten in the form x(t′′) = x(t)+λv ⇒
x(t + λ∆t)− x(t) = λv and therefore,
x˙(t) = lim
λ→+0
x(t + λ∆t)− x(t)
λ∆t
=
v
∆t
=⇒ v = x˙(t)∆t.
Further let us assume that during time interval [t, t′] there were a (finite) sequence of signed
contracts, such that their time periods of realization are not overlapping. Let m be a number
of contracts. One can think that the final time point of one contract is simultaneously the
starting point of another contract: if not we can always replenish system with an appropriate
number of zero contracts. So, interval [t, t′] is divided into m intervals, determined by points
t = t0 < t1 < . . . < tm = t
′, such that [tk−1, tk] are time intervals of contracts vk = x(tk)−x(tk−1)
realization, k = 1, . . . ,m. Put ∆tk = tk − tk−1 and due to previous formula find
x(t′) = x(t) +
m∑
k=1
vk = x(t) +
m∑
k=1
x˙(tk−1)∆tk = x(t) +
∫ t′
t
x˙(s)ds.
As soon as by assumption contractual process starts at the moment t = 0 at the point ω, we
have
x(t) = ω +
∫ t
0
x˙(s)ds, x˙(s) =
vk
∆tk
, ∀ s ∈ [tk−1, tk].
Further holding away ourself from the latter (simple) deduction or in other words, if we allow
ourself to consider a limit variant of last formula then the number of contacts is passing to
infinite and the realization time of each contract is passing to zero, one can do the following
conclusions.
(i) Contractual trajectory, which for a finite number of contracts is represented as integral of
some step function, in general case is the integral of some integrable on every finite interval
function x˙(·) and is defined via formula
x(t) = ω +
∫ t
0
x˙(s)ds. (3.1)
In other words contractual trajectory is an absolutely continuous23 on every interval [0, t], t > 0
map
x(·) : [0, +∞)→ A(X).
So, we have provided the first property of contractual trajectory definition.
(ii) Derivative x˙(·) of contractual trajectory in general case is defined almost everywhere on
[0, +∞) and the value x˙(t) defines a (momentary) contract, signed at the moment t ∈ [0, +∞).
If the time ∆t > 0 of contract realization is known, that formally means x˙(t′) = x˙(t′′), ∀ t′, t′′ ∈
[t, t + ∆t], the resulting (gross) contract can be found from v(t) = x˙(t)∆t. In other words,
22 Applying ‘physical’ interpretation, one can say that we postulate the uniform (constant) speed of contract
realization in interval [t, t′].
23 A function f(·) with domain [a, b] is said to be absolutely continuous if ∀ε > 0 ∃δ > 0 such that
Σmk=1|f(bk)− f(ak)| < ε holds for every finite system of pairwise non-overlapping intervals (ak, bk) ⊂ (a, b),
k = 1, 2, . . . ,m, which obeys Σmk=1(bk − ak) < δ.
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the derivative of contractual trajectory can be understood as a barter contract per time unit.
Notice also the obvious corollary: the range of derivative is the subspace of contracts, i.e.,
x˙(·) : [0, +∞)→ Lc, Lc = {v ∈ L | v = (vi)I :
∑
vi = 0}. (3.2)
One more remark in addition. What is a contract for given trajectory? By definition of
contractual trajectory (curve) we can not determine it in general because we do not know
the duration of contract’s realization (what does mean zero duration?). This is why one can
correctly say only about momentary contracts, or about the summation of contracts, signed
during a non-zero time interval. Keeping this point of view, one can say about summation of
contracts for a “measurable time” Ω ⊆ [0, τ ], where Ω is any measurable subset of interval. In
such a case we have ∑
Ωv(s) =
∫
Ω
x˙(s)ds.
Surely, items (i), (ii) do not describe all properties of contractual trajectory related with con-
tractual processes; these are only initial, unconditional requirements. Further let us consider
other features of trajectory which correspond to contractual processes. In addition it is nec-
essary to take into account conditions, at which contracts are signed, and also character of a
trajectory changes under the breaking of contracts.
For the constructive description of contractual processes, related with the breaking of contracts,
it is convenient to consider extended understanding of a trajectory described below, we shall
call this a coalitional trajectory.
Suppose that for each coalition S ⊆ I with at least two elements, card(S) ≥ 2, an (absolutely
continuous) map
vS : [0, +∞)→ LcS, LcS = {v ∈ L | v = (vi)I :
∑
i∈S
vi = 0 & vi = 0,∀ i /∈ S} (3.3)
is determined. Essentially, vS(t) is gross (total) contract, achieved by the members of a coalition
S at a moment t ≥ 0. A collection of all such maps {vS(t)}S∈K = V (t), related with a set of
permissible coalitions K ⊂ 2I , obviously determines a trajectory in previous sense by formula
x(t) = ω +
∑
S∈K
vS(t), t ≥ 0. (3.4)
Notice, that in this description of contractual trajectory we actually describe not only a current
allocation, but a set of varying with time contracts, where each coalition has the only current
gross contract (for forbidden coalitions — zero). As time elapsed this set can be transformed
according to the rules of proper-contractual behavior. Therefore, to ensure that an allocation
realized after partial breaking of the contracts from V (t) is feasible, it is necessary in addition
to require that V (t) is a web of contracts (relative to ω).
Finishing we would like to note one important thing. Basically the trajectory x(t), t ∈ [0, +∞)
comprises the whole information on the contracts made by the agents, their volumes and the
time moments of signing. This information is contained in the derivative of trajectory x˙(t).
Therefore a coalitional-contractual trajectory is not a new object, but just a convenient form
for representation of information in adequate aggregated kind. Really, for each map the value
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vS(t) at a point t ≥ 0 can be determined by the formula
vS(t) =
∫
Ωt
S
x˙(s)ds, ΩtS = {s ∈ [0, t] | x˙i(s) 6= 0, i ∈ S & x˙i(s) = 0, i ∈ I \ S}.
However there is one nuance here, which can appear in the case when two or more pairwise
non-intersected coalitions are independently signed new contracts at the same moment of time,
or simply the time intervals of contracts’ realizations are overlapping. Essentially, the consid-
eration of such situations is consistent, especially in coalitional-contractual context. To avoid
some possible collisions, related with appearing now ambiguity in the restoration of gross coali-
tional contract via derivative of trajectories, an easiest way is to conduct analysis in the terms
of a coalitional trajectory.
3.3. Contracting and recontracting processes
A coalition can sign a new contract only if all members of coalition have relevant motives in
signing, i.e., after contract’s realization (up to current moment) the utility of every member
has to increase. In last section we have seen that contract per time unit is the derivative of
trajectory at time point. Thus for smooth preferences one can think that contract v will be
signed by coalition S, i.e., trajectory moves along vector v = x˙(t) only if supp (v) = S and
〈x˙i(t),∇ui(x(t))〉 > 0, ∀ i ∈ S.
Since vi = 0 if i /∈ S, then we can write a determining condition:
x˙i(t) 6= 0 ⇒ 〈x˙i(t),∇ui(x(t))〉 > 0, ∀ i ∈ I, ∀ t ≥ 0. (3.5)
This condition characterizes moment t as the case of contract’s signing. Now let us consider
the case of contracts’ breaking.
The description of contractual process with the partial breaking of contracts is possible in
rather general framework. However in such a case the formal-mathematical analysis of process,
with the purpose to prove its convergence, looks very difficult, at least on this stage of research.
This is why further we shall make a several simplifying hypotheses. These hypotheses determine
basic parameters: which contracts, in which time moment and in which volume are broken off,
i.e., all vagueness of contractual process related with the breaking of contracts are revealed.
The decision on partial break of the contracts is accepted by each agent individually, in con-
ditions of a sufficient information for myopic-rational breaking of the contracts. We conceive
that, in difference with a signing of the new contract, where an individual needs to find the
partners and to pass a stage of negotiations about the future contract, the breaking of contracts
is simpler decision and, therefore, can be accepted and is realized without temporary delays,
as soon as there is the suitable opportunity. This motivates the following hypothesis.
(IB) Instantaneous Breaking of the contracts. In each time moment each individ-
ual instantly (for zero time) partially breaks the signed earlier contracts in optimum
volume.
This hypothesis does not say anything about what contracts and in which volume can be broken
off. In a general case pertinently to think, that each individual has an opportunity (right) to
break in any volume any contract, signed earlier current time moment t ≥ 0. However, to
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simplify the subsequent analysis, it is possible to consider for the beginning some particular
cases, a little bit limiting opportunities on break of the contracts.
For the aggregated contractual trajectory, defined in (3.1), (3.2) we shall postulate:
(UB) Uniform Breaking of all contracts. At each time moment each individual
can partially break all contracts, signed in economy to the given moment, but just
in identical measure (proportion).
This hypothesis assumes, that at a current moment t ∈ [0, +∞) each agent makes a decision
on break of the contracts. This decision is based on minimum of the information, extracted
only from current allocation x(t) and not accepting in attention the values x(t′), “passed” by
a trajectory in previous time moments t′ ∈ (0, t). Apparently, such sight on an opportunity to
break contracts is acceptable for an economy with small number of agents, where it is possible to
assume, that the contracts are signed only by a coalition of all agents (grand coalition). However
if economy consists of many agents this assumption is problematic. Really, it is not clear why do
effect of breaking of contracts with involved persons has to influence in such crucial manner —
the break in the same measure — on uninvolved directly into contract individuals? However,
to carry out break only for a part of the contracts in which agent is involved, that is better
for essence of contractual process, it is necessary that this part to be explicit. One of simple
variants of revealing this information is to consider the trajectory in coalitional-contractual
form described in the previous section.
For coalitional trajectory, described in (3.3), ( 3.4) we shall assume:
(CUB) Coalitional Uniform Breaking of contracts. At each moment of time each
individual can partially break all contracts, signed by any coalition, in which she/he
participates, and in limits of a coalition in an identical measure, but, probably, in
different proportions for different coalitions.
From the informational point of view this hypothesis means, that each agent stores (remembers)
the aggregated information about intra-coalition exchanges, in the form of “gross” contract.
Thus, now the results of breaking of contracts by an individual will influence only the agents
directly involved in the barter contract with this individual by means of gross coalitional con-
tract, and it does not concern to exchanges in other coalitions. As the special case of this
hypothesis, it is possible to examine variant when breaking and the signing of new contracts
occurs in frameworks of the same coalition.
4. PROPER-CONTRACTUAL UB-PROCESSES:
UNIFORM BREAKING OF CONTRACTS
In the previous section we have discussed contractual processes without breaking of contracts,
and also have considered some properties and hypotheses, related with the partial breaking of
contracts, signed earlier current time moment. Further we are going to consider processes, in
which the signing and partial break of the contracts go in simultaneous mode.
At first, with the purpose to simplify the subsequent analysis, we shall consider the case of
aggregated proper-contractual trajectory, for which it is admitted only partial breaking of all
contracts signed to the current moment, and all in an equal measure.
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Further we have to clarify that means the fact that an individual i at the moment t did not
want, but after contract v signing, at some moment τ > t he/she wants to partially break
contracts. The first means that 〈∇ui(x(t)), xi(t) − ωi〉 ≥ 0, the second one that 〈∇ui(xi(t) +
(τ − t)vi), xi(t) + (τ − t)vi − ωi〉 < 0. Therefore, does exist a moment t + ∆t ∈ [t, τ ] such that
〈∇ui(xi(t) + ∆tvi), xi(t) + ∆tvi − ωi〉 = 0.
Notice also, that by virtue of (IB) the effect of contracts’ breaking can influence the change of
a trajectory at a moment t if and only if in each neighborhood of t there is a moment τ > t
with the specified above properties. Passing τ → t we obtain
〈∇ui(xi(t)), xi(t)− ωi〉 = 0, (4.1)
and this is the first condition, which defines the motion of trajectory with contracts’ breaking.
Notice that the point defined by equation (4.1) is the maximal point of utility ui(yi) on the ray
starting at the point ωi in direction xi − ωi (here yi = ωi + λ(xi − ωi), λ ≥ 0).
Further let us consider another condition. Primary, at the time t of signing, contract v was
mutually beneficial at the point x(t). The fact that at the moment τ > t an individual
i ∈ supp (v) partially breaks gross contract x(t) + (τ − t)v − ω in a volume 1 − α means
that from the point x(t) the trajectory moves to point z = ω + α(x(t) + (τ − t)v − ω) =
(1 − α)ω + α(x(t) + (τ − t)v), 0 ≤ α < 1. Once again this is a maximum point for agent i’s
utility on the linear segment, linking x(t) + (τ − t)v with initial endowments vector (thus there
is a projection along straight line going through two points). Therefore new point of trajectory
j’s indif. curves i’s indif. curves
S = {i, j}
zi = ωi + α(xi(t) + ∆tvi − ωi)
←↩ {y : 〈yi − ωi,∇ui(yi)〉 = 0}q
xi
q
ωi
qO
∆tvi
^hi
zi
Fig. 1. Proper-contractual transition
has to satisfy to equation
〈∇ui(xi(τ)), xi(τ)− ωi〉 = 0.
Setting ∆t = τ − t and substituting in equation expressions
xi(t + ∆t) = xi(t) + ∆tx˙i(t) + o(∆t),
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∇ui(xi(t + ∆t)) = ∇ui(xi(t)) +∇2ui(xi(t))(∆tx˙i(t) + o(∆t)) + o(∆tx˙i(t) + o(∆t)),
which are true due to Taylor’s formula,24 and taking into account (4.1), we find
∆t〈∇ui(xi(t)), x˙i(t)〉+ ∆t〈∇2ui(xi(t))x˙i(t), xi(t)− ωi〉+
∆t2〈∇2ui(xi(t))x˙i(t), x˙i(t)〉+ o(∆t) = 0.
Now one can divide this on ∆t and pass to limit over ∆t → 0. As a result we are coming to
equation
∇ui(xi(t))x˙i(t) + 〈∇2ui(xi(t))x˙i(t), xi(t)− ωi〉 = 0 ⇐⇒
〈hi(xi(t)), x˙i(t)〉 = 0, hi(xi(t)) = ∇ui(xi(t)) +∇2ui(xi(t))(xi(t)− ωi). (4.2)
Equations (4.1), (4.2) describe important properties of contractual trajectory but still do not
completely define process. It is necessary also take into account the dependence of x˙(t) from
initially mutually beneficial contract v, signing which agents are coming to beneficial breaking
of contracts for one of individuals. The situation is illustrated in Fig. 1 (in Edgeworth box
style), which reflects a character of transition and objects involved into analysis.
Recall that from the point x(t) trajectory moves on to the point x(t+∆t) = ω+αi(x(t)+∆tv−ω),
0 ≤ αi < 1 at the moment t + ∆t. In general the value αi depends on current consumption
xi(t), (momentary) contract v and duration ∆t > 0 of its realization. By virtue of assumption
(S) the model is smooth, and it is easily to see, that αi(x, v, ∆t) is differentiable function (in
general locally), implicitly defined from the equation
〈∇ui(xi(t + ∆t)), xi(t + ∆t)− ωi〉 = 0, xi(t + ∆t) = (1− αi)ωi + αi(xi(t) + ∆tvi). (4.3)
Here parameter αi ≥ 0 determines a point (1− αi)ωi + αi(xi(t) + ∆tvi) of i’s utility maximum
on the line, parameterized as: ωi + λ(xi(t) + ∆tvi − ωi), λ ≥ 0. If αi < 1, then at a point
xi(t) + ∆tvi the breaking of contracts is realized in volume 1− αi, and, there is no the break if
αi ≥ 1.
From representation xi(t + ∆t) in the right part of (4.3) we have
xi(t + ∆t)− xi(t)
∆t
=
(αi(x, v, ∆t)− 1)
∆t
(xi(t)− ωi) + αi(x, v, ∆t)vi,
whence, passing to a limit on ∆t → 0, with the account αi(x(t), v, ∆t)|∆t=0 = 1 (by virtue of
(4.1)), we obtain
x˙i(t) = λi(xi(t)− ωi) + vi, λi = ∂αi(x(t), v, ∆t)
∂∆t
|∆t=0.
Further, value λi is possible to find from the equation (4.2),
〈hi(xi(t)), λi(xi(t)− ωi) + vi〉 = 0 ⇒ λi = 〈hi(xi(t)), vi〉〈hi(xi(t)), (ωi − xi(t))〉 . (4.4)
Thus, if at a moment t there exists only one agent, satisfying to (4.1), with number i, the
trajectory locally will change under the law
x˙(t) = λi(x, v)(x(t)− ω) + v, λi(x, v) = 〈hi(xi(t)), vi〉〈hi(xi(t)), (ωi − xi(t))〉 .
24 o(·) is the standard notation of infinitesimal value.
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Moreover, presented considerations allow to reveal complete conditions, describing a moment t
as a situation of break of the contracts at a current allocation x(t) and when (momentary) a
contract v is signing. The break is realized if the individual i satisfies (4.1), value αi(x(t), v, ∆t)
is locally decreased in ∆t at a point ∆t = 0, i.e., if derivative with respect to ∆t is negative. So,
for breaking it is necessary and enough25 that λi(x, v) < 0. Further, by virtue of the assumption
(S) the matrix of second partial derivatives ∇2ui(xi(t)) is negatively defined, whence by virtue
of (4.1) and (4.2) for xi(t)− ωi 6= 0 we conclude
〈hi(xi(t)), ωi − xi(t)〉 = −〈ωi − xi(t),∇2ui(xi(t))(ωi − xi(t))〉 > 0.
Thus, denominator in (4.4) is always positive and, therefore, the situation of breaking of con-
tracts by the individual i is completely characterized by condition (4.1) and additional condition
〈hi(xi(t)), vi〉 < 0.
What will take place in the case of several agents, desiring to break off contracts, when a new
contract v starts to be realized? In other words, how will the contractual process go, if more
than one individual satisfies (4.1)? For all these individuals values αi(x(t), v, ∆t)|∆t=0 = 1, but
the character of process is determined by their derivatives. It is clear, that the break will
happen only if at least one derivative relative to ∆t is negative, and the measure of breaking is
defined by greatest absolute value from negative derivatives. Thus, it is proved the following
Lemma 4.1. Consider contractual process with partial breaking of barter contracts, satisfying
to hypotheses (IB), (UB) — Instant Uniform Breaking of all contracts. Let (x, v) be a couple
achieved in process at a moment t ≥ 0, where x = x(t) = (x1, . . . , xn) is allocation and
v = (v1, . . . , vn) is a momentary mutually beneficial barter contract, signed among individuals
at the moment t. A pair (x, v) sets a situation of breaking of contracts if and only if for some
i ∈ I takes place
〈∇ui(xi(t)), xi(t)− ωi〉 = 0 & 〈hi(xi(t)), vi〉 < 0, (4.5)
hi(xi(t)) = ∇ui(xi(t)) +∇2ui(xi(t))(xi(t)− ωi).
In such case the local law of contractual process is defined by equation
x˙(t) = λ(x, v)(x(t)− ω) + v, (4.6)
where λ(x, v) is minimum of λi(xi, vi), calculated for individuals i ∈ I, satisfying condition
〈∇ui(xi(t)), xi(t)− ωi〉 = 0; here
λi(xi, vi) =
〈hi(xi(t)), vi〉
〈hi(xi(t)), (ωi − xi(t))〉 .
As it already was noted, if the break of contracts does not occur, the local law of change of
a contractual trajectory is set by a rule x˙(t) = v. Hence, one can apply the law (4.6) in a
general case, if for λ(x, v) > 0 replace this value by zero. Combining this fact with the result
of previous Lemma 4.1, we come to the following definition of proper-contractual trajectories.
Let’s define
λmin(x, v) = 0
∧
min
{ 〈hi(xi), vi〉
〈hi(xi), (ωi − xi)〉
∣∣∣∣ i : 〈∇ui(xi), xi − ωi〉 = 0
}
.26 (4.7)
25 When λi(x, v) = 0 the point x = x(t) can be or to not be a limit point of breaking contracts points of a
trajectory.
26 Here standardly a ∧ b = min{a, b}.
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Definition 4.1. An absolutely continuous map x(·) : [0, +∞)→ A(X) is called proper con-
tractual trajectory under hypotheses (IB), (UB), if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) 〈∇ui(xi(t)), xi(t)− ωi〉 ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ I;
(ii) Derivative of the trajectory obeys the law
x˙(t) = λmin(x, v)(x(t)− ω) + v, (4.8)
where v ∈ Lc is mutually beneficial contract, i.e., 〈∇ui(xi(t)), vi〉 > 0, ∀ i ∈ supp (v), and value
λmin(x, v) is defined by (4.7).
Notice, that due to this definition proper contractual trajectory is actually described as a
solution of some differential inclusion
x˙(t) ∈ F (x), x(0) = ω
on interval [0, +∞), where the right hand side obeys (i), (ii).
The law of change of proper contractual trajectory (4.8) can have another form, but, certainly,
the law should to satisfy restrictions (4.1), (4.2). Really, (4.8) postulates the certain form of
projection of current allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) on area, defined by constrains
〈∇ui(xi(t)), xi(t)− ωi〉 ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ I.
Essentially, this projection corresponds to a procedure of partial breaking of all contracts, and
the area, on which allocation is projected, is the set of all allocations stable relative to the partial
breaking of all contracts (or, alternatively, realized by a proper-contractual web V = {x− ω},
see Marakulin, 2003). In doing so the projection is realized along the ray (ωi − xi), where i
is the individual, satisfying (4.1), onto hyperplane {z ∈ Rl | 〈hi(xi), z〉 = 〈hi(xi), xi〉}, where
the vector hi(xi) is determined by (4.2). Such kind of projection assumes, that only contracts
signed before the moment t may be broken, and that the contract v is untouched. However it
is possible to postulate another law of breaking, in which the breaking of current new contract
is possible:
x˙(t) = β(x, v)v + (1− β(x, v))(ω − x(t)). (4.9)
This process can be treated as a break with delay, i.e., the break occurs only after realization
of (momentary) contract v. A value β(x, v) can be found from the equation (4.2), whence, if i
satisfies (4.1), we find
β(x, v) = βi(xi(t), vi) =
〈hi, xi(t)− ωi〉
〈hi, xi(t)− ωi〉+ 〈hi, vi〉 . (4.10)
Notice, that numerator in (4.10) is always negative and that the denominator is a sum of
numerator with the value 〈hi, vi〉, which in a case of contracts’ breaking is negative, and,
therefore, if the break of the contracts is beneficial for i, the whole ratio is a value between zero
and unit. The value βi(xi(t), vi) ≤ 1 defines for process (4.9) a measure of contracts’ breaking:
when it is less the break is more. Moreover, for βi(xi(t), vi) ≥ 1 should be 〈hi, vi〉 ≥ 0 and the
break does not occur. In case when several individuals satisfy (4.1) the break should come true
at a maximum level. Therefore, the law of a trajectory change has the following form. Let’s
define
βmin = βmin(x(t), v) = 1 ∧min{βi | i ∈ I : 〈∇ui(xi(t)), xi(t)− ωi〉 = 0},
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where values βi(x(t), v) are set by the formula (4.10). Then our process obeys the law
x˙(t) = βminv + (1− βmin)(ω − x(t)), (4.11)
where v ∈ Lc is a mutually beneficial contract, i.e., 〈∇ui(xi(t)), vi〉 > 0, ∀ i ∈ supp (v).
How described processes correspond among themselves? In essence they are equivalent. Really,
if only one agent is ready to break contracts and carries out it in process (4.8) then locally this
law can written as
x˙(t) =
〈hi(xi(t)), vi〉
〈hi(xi(t)), (ωi − xi(t))〉(x(t)− ω) + v =
1
βi
[βiv + (1− βi)(ω − x(t))],
where βi is defined by (4.10). It is easy to see that in general case (a few agents satisfy (4.1))
will be the similar connection, i.e., we have
x˙(t) = λmin(x, v)(x(t)− ω) + v = 1
βmin(x, v)
[βmin(x, v)v + (1− βmin(x, v))(ω − x(t))].
Thus, the distinction in processes is reduced to some positive factor, defined by function
βmin(x, v), that is graded by the arbitrariness in a choice of mutually beneficial contract v.27
5. PROPER-CONTRACTUAL CUB-PROCESSES:
COALITIONAL-UNIFORM BREAKING OF CONTRACTS
Further we shall consider the concept of coalitional proper-contractual trajectories, i.e., a tra-
jectory, satisfying to hypothesis (CUB) (instead of (UB)). To do it we can apply a significant
part of the above analysis, but there are also essential differences:
(1) The partial breaking of gross intra-coalitional contract for different coalitions can be realized
in a different degree (measure).
(2) Breaking the gross coalitional contract the individuals are guided not on initial endowments
allocation, available in the beginning of a trajectory, but on their sum with a flow of goods,
received from participation in contracts of other coalitions.
(3) The signing of a new barter contract by the members of a coalition with, probably, subse-
quent breaking of intra-coalitional contract, potentially can also initiate the break of contracts
in other coalitions (if the individual participates in contract).
The difficulties which may happen here are caused by item (3), which in general case can entail
hardly predictable character of contractual process under hypothesis (IB) — instantaneous
breaking of the contracts. A problem, with which we encounter, can be illustrated by the fol-
lowing example. Let us consider economy with three agents and let all coalitions are permitted.
Let the coalition {1, 2, 3} be active and its members sign a new contract, which being realized
creates the following situation. All three agents can wish to partially break off the contracts in
bilateral coalitions. However the break of the contracts in coalition changes consumption bun-
dles of its members and, thus, influences a measure of desirable break of the contracts in other
27 Since the law (4.8) for a contract w = βmin(x, v)v is equivalent to the law (4.11) relative to v.
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coalition. For example, in a coalition {i, j} the agent i would like to break off intra-coalitional
contract in volume 1
2
, if a coalition {i, k} does not break anything. However, if the agent k will
break the coalitional contract in volume 1
3
, the agent i changes opinion on volume of break of
contract in {i, j} on the break in a measure 1
3
. However, on the opinion of individual k can
affect the break of contract in a coalition {k, j}, initiated by the agent j, the opinion of which
is influenced by a measure of break of contract in {i, j}, it may be 1
2
or e.g. 1
3
, and etc. So,
what will take place as a result of such cyclic breaking of the contracts?
Before the study a general case, it is reasonable to analyze some particular variants of proper-
contractual process.
One of opportunities is to try to modify the assumption (IB). Really, one can assume that,
similarly to the signing of new contract, a breaking of contracts in a coalition occurs only if this
coalition is active. The passive coalition neither able to sign a new contract nor break signed
earlier contracts. Further this behavioral hypothesis is designated as (IBA) (i.e. (IB) only
for active coalitions).
The second opportunity consists in restriction of a class K of permitted coalitions. For example,
it can be a class all paired (two elements) coalitions. Then, if the coalition {i, j} is active in
contractual process, it can entail breaks of contracts only in coalitions {i, k} and {k, j}, where
k 6= i, j. Moreover if only one coalition is active at a current moment of time then only it’s
members, i and j, can initiate the breaking of contracts and the transition is unequivocally
determined.
5.1. Breaking of contracts in active coalitions
The serious problems do not arise, if in addition to assume that only non-intersected coalitions
can be active when time is going, of course for different time moments there may be the different
sets of active coalitions. Besides we shall assume, that if in some active coalition there is an
agent, aspiring to break contracts without signing of new contract, then only the breaking is
realized in contractual process for this coalition at a current moment of time. Further we shall
describe this process in details.
Let some coalition-contractual trajectory be given, described by a set of maps {vS(t)}S∈K,
adequate to some set of permitted coalitions K ⊂ 2I . These maps (see (3.3)) are absolute
continuous on [0,∞) and satisfy: ∀ t ≥ 0
vS(t) = (vSi (t))I :
∑
i∈S
vSi (t) = 0 & v
S
i (t) = 0, ∀ i /∈ S.
The trajectory is related with these maps by equality
x(t) = ω +
∑
S∈K
vS(t), t ≥ 0.
Notice, that now, in difference with IUB-trajectory by Definition 4.1, the state of trajectory
x(t) can already not satisfy to a condition of absence of desire to partially break intra-coalitional
gross contracts vS(t) for the agents from permitted coalitions S ∈ K, i.e., item (i) in coalitional
context of Definition 4.1 can be broken. This is the basic difference of CUB-process with
breaking only in active coalitions.
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 31
Let in a moment t ≥ 0 there is a list of active coalitions Υ(t) = {S1, . . . , Sk} ⊂ K, which
are pairwise non-intersected. At the given moment t the exchange processes can go only in
coalitions from this list. Thus for each of active coalitions (we shall denote a current one as S)
there can be realized one of two opportunities.
First: the members of coalition S do not desire while to break gross coalitional contract vS(t),
and there is an opportunity to sign a new mutually beneficial contract (if not, then coalition is
idle, i.e., the zero contract is signed).
Second: there is an individual in S, aspiring to break the coalitional contract vS(t).
Further we consider specified opportunities consistently.
Let at a moment t the first opportunity is realized and coalition S signs a momentary mutually
beneficial contract wS = (wSi )S. Now conditions determining a situation of contracts’ breaking
are similar to described in Lemma 4.1 and adapted to coalition-contractual trajectory. Really,
the favourable situation for the breaking of gross contract vS(t) as a result of the new contract
realization can happen only if for some i ∈ S
〈∇ui(xi(t)), vSi (t)〉 = 0
takes place, this is an analogue of a condition (4.1). Similarly, the breaking of contract vS(t) 6= 0
occurs if and only if for one of agents, satisfying to the previous condition
〈hSi (x, vS(t)), wSi 〉 < 0, hSi (x, vS(t)) = ∇ui(xi(t)) +∇2ui(xi(t))vSi (t) (5.1)
takes place. Now, if only one agent i ∈ S aspires to break contracts, for the agents from S the
law of change of a trajectory can look like
v˙S(t) = λSi (x, v
S, wS)vS(t) + wS, λi(x, v
S, wS) = − 〈h
S
i (xi, v
S
i (t)), w
S
i 〉
〈hSi (xi, vSi (t)), vSi (t))〉
.
If more than one agent of the coalition aspire to break coalitional contract, instead of
λSi (x, v
S, wS) in the law of a trajectory one have to take a minimum from values of this type
relative to the set of all such agents. For S ∈ Υ(t) let us determine
λminS (x, v
S(t), wS) = 0
∧
min
{−〈hSi (x, vS(t)), wSi 〉
〈hSi (x, vS(t)), vSi (t)〉
∣∣∣∣ i ∈ S : 〈∇ui(xi), vSi (t)〉 = 0
}
(5.2)
and recall that
LcS = {w ∈ L | w = (wi)I :
∑
i∈S
wi = 0 & wi = 0, ∀ i /∈ S}
denotes the space of the possible contracts for coalition S ⊆ I.
Let for some i ∈ S the breaking of gross coalitional contract is favourable, i.e.
〈∇ui(xi), vSi (t)〉 < 0
takes place. We may think, that in such a case the new contract does not obtain, and there
is only the break of current contract vSi (t). The latter means, that derivative of coalitional
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contract should be proportional to a vector −vS(t), that allows to postulate the law28
v˙S(t) = −vS(t).
As a result we are coming to the following definition.
Definition 5.1. A set {vS(t)}S∈K of absolutely continuous maps vS(·) : [0, +∞)→ LcS is called
coalitional proper contractual trajectory under hypotheses (IBA), (CUB), if the following con-
ditions are satisfied:
(i) For every t ≥ 0 there is defined a list Υ(t) = {S1, . . . , Sk} ⊂ K of active pairwise non-
intersected coalitions, in which and only in them, contractual processes may go on;
(ii) The derivative of a trajectory is defined by a set of momentary mutually beneficial contracts
{wS}S∈Υ(t), signed among the members of active at the moment t ≥ 0 coalitions Υ(t) ⊂ K, and
obeys the law
v˙S(t) = λminS (x, v
S(t), wS)vS(t) + wS, S ∈ Υ(t), (5.3)
where if
〈∇ui(xi(t)), vSi (t)〉 ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ S ∈ Υ(t)
the value λminS (x, v
S(t), wS) is defined by formula (5.2). If
〈∇ui(xi(t)), vSi (t)〉 < 0, for some i ∈ S ∈ Υ(t)
then λminS (x, v
S(t), wS) = −1 and wS = 0 takes place.
(iii) For T ∈ K \ Υ(t), i.e., if coalition T at moment t is passive (non-involved in contractual
process), then v˙T (t) = 0 and gross intra-coalitional contract does not change.
5.2. Proper contractual bilateral CUB-process
In this section we shall assume, that the set K of permitted coalitions in contractual process is
exhausted by all paired coalitions, i.e., we consider the case when
K = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ I & i 6= j}.
In addition we shall assume, that at any current time moment t ≥ 0 only one from paired
coalitions {i, j} can sign a new mutually beneficial contract wij.
Under these hypotheses one can describe proper-contractual process, adequate to postulates
(IB) and (CUB). Really, as only paired coalitions are permitted then the breaking of contracts
initiated by the signing of a new contract may proceed in all coalitions in a predictable way
and in conformity with (IB) — instantaneous breaking of all unprofitable contracts. Let us
describe this process.
Let to a moment t ≥ 0 for any permitted coalition S = {i, j} a state of a trajectory x(t) =∑
vij(t)+ω, which is defined via a family of gross coalitional contracts vij(t), obey to a condition
of absence of desire to partially break them. This can be expressed in a form
〈∇uk(xk(t)), vijk (t)〉 ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ {i, j}, ∀ i, j ∈ I.
28 This law of trajectory’s change can be deduced analytically, if in a basis of the analysis one takes a trajectory
by (4.11), for which specified situation is realized in limit when βmin → 1.
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Fix further coalition S = {i, j}, which we think to be active one at a moment t, and let its
members sign a new contract wij. Then at moment τ = t + ∆t > t the current consumption
bundles will look like:
xk(τ) = ωk +
∑
m6=i,j
vkmk (t) + v
ki
k (t)α
i
k(w
ij, ∆t) + vkjk (t)α
j
k(w
ij, ∆t), k 6= i, j;
xi(τ) = ωi +
∑
k 6=i,j
viki (t)α
i
k(w
ij, ∆t) + αij(wij, ∆t)[viji (t) + ∆tw
ij
i ];
xj(τ) = ωj +
∑
k 6=i,j
vjkj (t)α
j
k(w
ij, ∆t) + αij(wij, ∆t)[vijj (t) + ∆tw
ij
j ].
Here all values αik(w
ij, ∆t), αjk(w
ij, ∆t) and αij(wij, ∆t) are between zero and one and define saved
volumes of gross coalitional contracts depending on the new contract wij and time interval of its
realization ∆t ≈ 0. Thus for ∆t = 0 all of them are equal to unit. Notice that only individuals
i and j can wish to break off the signed earlier contracts. Moreover, only contracts between i
and agents from
I(i) = {k ∈ I | k 6= i, 〈∇ui(xi(t)), viki (t)〉 = 0},
can be broken, similarly between j and agents from
I(j) = {k ∈ I | k 6= j, 〈∇uj(xj(t)), vjkj (t)〉 = 0}.
If simultaneously j /∈ I(i) and i /∈ I(j), then only the contracts between one of the members of
a coalition {i, j} and non-members of the coalition can broken off. In this case αij(wij, ∆t) = 1
for small ∆t. In opposite case it is possible αij(wij, ∆t) < 1, i.e. coalition {i, j} can also be
involved in the process of contracts’ breaking.
Further, as well as earlier, by virtue of the Taylor’s formula
∇ui(xi(t + ∆t)) = ∇ui(xi(t)) +∇2ui(xi(t))(∆tx˙i(t) + o(∆t)) + o(∆tx˙i(t) + o(∆t)),
and similar representation for j. Besides by virtue of previous considerations we have
x˙i(t) =
∑
k 6=i,j
viki (t)λ
i
k(w
ij) + λji (w
ij)viji (t) + w
ij
i ;
where
λik(w
ij) =
∂αik(w
ij, ∆t)
∂∆t
|∆t=0, λji (wij) =
∂αij(wij, ∆t)
∂∆t
|∆t=0.
Here values λik(w
ij) and λij(wij) one can find solving a system of the equations, received from
the first order necessary conditions (now they are also sufficient). Really, if I(i)b ⊆ I(i) is the
set of contractors for i, for which the break of contracts is really occurs, formally for them
λik(w
ij) < 0, then it should be
〈∇ui(xi(t + ∆t)), vkii 〉 = 0, k ∈ I(i)b.
Using further the representation of a gradient, after necessary transformations, division on ∆t,
with the subsequent passing to limit in ∆t → 0, we come to a linear system of the equations
for λik = λ
i
k(w
ij):
〈∇2ui(xi(t))x˙i(t), vkii 〉 = 0, k ∈ I(i)b ⇐⇒
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∑
m∈I(i)b
vkii [−∇2ui(xi(t))]vmii λim = vkii ∇2ui(xi(t))wiji , k ∈ I(i)b. (5.4)
Let us show now, that due to assumption (S) this system has an unique solution only if the sys-
tem of vectors {vkii }k∈I(i)b is linearly independent. Really, from (S) the matrix A = −∇2ui(xi(t))
is positive definite and, therefore, it has a square root, i.e., there exists a symmetric positive
definite matrix B =
√
A, satisfying B2 = A. Now the matrix of coefficients of system is rep-
resented as a Grama matrix ||〈bk, bm〉||k,m∈I(i)b for the system of vectors bk = Bvkii , k ∈ I(i)b,
and system (5.4) can be rewritten in a form
∑
m∈I(i)b
〈bk, bm〉λim = −〈bk, Bwiji 〉, k ∈ I(i)b. (5.5)
It is known from linear algebra, that Grama matrix for a system of vectors is nonsingular one
only when the system is linearly independent. However as soon as B is nonsingular matrix,
which determines nonsingular linear transformation, the system of vectors {bk}k∈I(i)b is linearly
independent if and only if the system {vkii }k∈I(i)b is linearly independent.
Recall, that in general it is not enough that system (5.4) has a unique solution it is also
necessary, that the solution is non-positive in each component.
Actually, in some sense a solution of system (5.4) always exists, because values λim can be found
as an limiting solution of a problem of convex optimization for a given (fixed) ∆t > 0 on the
compact set of variables 0 ≤ αim ≤ 1. However, if the system of vectors {vkii }k∈I(i) is linearly
dependent, this solution may be not unique (in spite of the fact that functions ui are strictly
concave).
It is not easy to take into account all specified difficulties, which may appear in described context
of proper contractual process — CUB-process with paired coalitions, it is too cumbersome for
a first sight. This is why we specify below only the law of change of trajectories in non-
degenerated case: it is a situation, when system (5.4) or, accordingly, (5.5), has an unique
non-positive solution for both agents, i and j. There are two variants of this situation.
First. Assume, that in a coalition {i, j} no agent aspire to break coalitional contract v ij(t)
after realization of momentary contract wij. It means, that for i either 〈∇ui(xi(t)), viji 〉 > 0,
or 〈∇ui(xi(t)), viji 〉 = 0 and in the solution of system (5.5) (which is unique!) takes place
λji (w
ij) = 0. Similar properties should be carried out for the individual j. Thus, in this case
j /∈ I(i)b and i /∈ I(j)b simultaneously. Then at the point t the law looks like:


v˙ij(t) = wij,
v˙ik(t) = λik(w
ij)vik(t), k ∈ I(i)b,
v˙jk(t) = λjk(w
ij)vjk(t), k ∈ I(j)b,
v˙km(t) = 0, for other pairs (k,m).
Here all values λik(w
ij) and λjk(w
ij) are found as a solution of system (5.5) (for j its own similar).
Second. Let in the coalition {i, j} one of agents aspire to break coalitional contract v ij(t)
after realization of momentary contract wij. It is possible only if, for example for agent i,
〈∇ui(xi(t)), viji 〉 = 0 and if in the solution of system (5.5) we have λji (wij) < 0 (or similar
conditions for j). Now define λijmin = λ
j
i (w
ij)∧λij(wij) < 0 and assume that individual i wishes
to break off contract vij(t) in the greatest measure, i.e., λji (w
ij) ≤ λij(wij). It is a situation, in
which the individual i imposes to the agent j the greater break of gross barter contract, than
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j wishes. However it is nothing to do for j, he/she can only accept such rules of game, in so
doing changing the initial plans of breaking of the contracts with other individuals. These new
volumes of break should be found as a solution of system similar to (5.4), but for the agent j
and with fixed unknown variable at vijj (t), where one has to take λ
ij
min. Thus, volumes λ
j
m of
breaking of bilateral contracts between j and other agents now can be found from system
∑
m∈I(j)b,m6=i
vkjj [−∇2uj(xj)]vmjj λjm = vkjj [∇2uj(xj)](wijj + λijminvijj ), k ∈ I(j)b, k 6= i.
Of course, everything said above can be correct only if all values to be found are non-positive
(otherwise one needs to replace positive values by zero and to continue the search of solution...)
As a result, in this case we come to a system of a type


v˙ij(t) = λijminv
ij + wij,
v˙ik(t) = λik(w
ij)vik(t), k ∈ I(i)b,
v˙jk(t) = λjk(w
ij)vjk(t), k 6= i, k ∈ I(j)b,
v˙km(t) = 0, for other pairs (k,m).
We finish the description of bilateral contractual process at this point — basic character of this
should be clear, but there is a wide variety of arising variants, which are rather cumbersome.
This essentially reduces prospects on hereinafter effective analysis of convergence in a more-or-
less general case.
6. PROPER-CONTRACTUAL PROCESSES: FINAL
SPECIFICATIONS AND ASSOCIATED PRICE PROCESS
In the previous sections there were considered basic hypotheses about behavior of the individ-
uals, adequate to contractual processes with partial breaking of the contracts. Besides there
were developed some variants of proper contractual processes (trajectories), which corresponds
to different combinations of these behavioral hypotheses. The elaborated processes actually
were described in the terms of differential inclusions with an autonomous right part, having
form
x˙(t) ∈ F (x), x(0) = ω, t ∈ [0, +∞).
However for the analysis of convergence of contractual processes this form is not quite conve-
nient, and already for process without breaking of the contracts, for the convergence (to Pareto
boundary) there are required some additional assumptions, ensuring the contractual process is
going fast enough (see section 2.4 and footnote 16)). We could formulate the necessary hypothe-
ses in general terms of process, however more convenient form is simply to add in the description
of process some trade rule, which unequivocally determines process as a whole. Doing so, we
actually fix some selector of point-to-set mapping, described via differential inclusion. Thus,
some additional conditions on a contractual trajectory will be made out as the requirements
to a rule of trade. Further we shall consider a rule of trade close to stated in sections 2.3, 2.4,
but in an adequate form for contractual processes.
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6.1. Trade rule for a contractual trajectory
Let us consider a coalitional proper-contractual trajectory, corresponding to CUB-process by
Definition 5.1. The trajectory is set by collection {vS(t)}S∈K absolutely continuous maps
vS(·) : [0, +∞)→ LcS, satisfying to conditions (i)–(iii). Now we have to specify two things.
First. In item (i) it is necessary to postulate the law, revealing for a current moment t ≥ 0 a
set of active coalitions Υ(t) = {S1, . . . , Sk} ⊂ K. Apparently, the simplest way to solve this
problem is, that for each permitted coalition S ∈ K to set open, with infinite measure29 a
subset US ⊂ [0, +∞) of time moments, in which the coalition is active. Further let’s define
Υ(t) = {S ∈ K | t ∈ US}
and also postulate, that for each t ≥ 0 set Υ(t) (can be empty) consists from pairwise non-
intersected coalitions.
Second. In item (ii) it is necessary to specify which of the mutually beneficial contracts is
signed by the members of an active coalition. And now occurs a map, that it is possible to
name a trade rule. As soon as the fact that a contract is mutually beneficial for the members of
a coalition depends only on current consumption bundles we can assume that for each coalition
S ∈ K there is determined a continuous map
wS : A(X)→ LcS = {w ∈ L | w = (wi)I :
∑
i∈S
wi = 0 & wi = 0, ∀ i /∈ S},
such that
ui(xi + w
S
i (x)) > ui(xi) ⇐⇒ ∃ ν ∈ LcS : ui(xi + νi) > ui(xi) ∀ i ∈ S, (6.1)
and
@ ν ∈ LcS : ui(xi + νi) > ui(xi) ∀ i ∈ S ⇒ wS(x) = 0.
The value wS(x) ∈ LcS unequivocally specifies the contract, which will be signed by a coalition
S at moment t under two conditions: 1) if S ∈ Υ(t), i.e., the coalition has to be active, and 2)
if x(t) = x, i.e., if allocation achieved by a trajectory at moment t coincides with x. The stated
requirements to the map wS(·), S ∈ K mean, that at each time moment when the coalition is
active some mutually beneficial contract is signed, if there is such opportunity at all; if no, the
contract does not signed (more precisely, the zero contract is signed). Notice that when utilities
are differentiable instead of (6.1) it is appropriate to apply condition presented for gradients
(derivatives by direction):
〈∇ui(xi), wSi (x)〉 > 0 ⇐⇒ ∃ ν ∈ LcS : ui(xi + νi) > ui(xi) ∀ i ∈ S.
Really, requirement (6.1) seems quite correct for discrete time presentation, however when time
is continuous wS(x(t)) is a momentary contract which defines not only beneficial exchange
proportions but also the speed of exchange processes (multiplying wS(x(t)) by a number over
unit we increase the speed of exchange and for positive but less than unit numbers a speed
is decreasing and etc.). Integrating wS(x(t)) over time on interval [t, t + ∆t] one can find a
gross contract, obeying (6.1) in the moment t and when a time of its realization is ∆t > 0 (see
comments from section 3.2).
29 This property is necessary so that the coalition was capable to realize the interests at least in infinity.
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 37
So, up to the moment coalitional proper-contractual process and the trajectory are completely
described, for it is enough in Definition 5.1 to add the additional factors: sets US, S ∈ K,
determining current structure of active coalitions Υ(t), and map wS(·), S ∈ K, specifying
contracts signed by active coalitions wS(x(t)), which is necessary to use in the law (5.3).
Actually we have described not only coalitional, but also aggregated proper-contractual trajec-
tory, determined in Definition 4.1. Really, aggregated trajectory turns out from coalitional one
if K = {I}. Though, certainly, in this case only a trade rule, formalized by map wI(·) will be
actually applied (requirements to this map can be relaxed a little bit).
In closing of this section we wold like to do an important remark. The right hand side of
equation determining the law of contractual trajectory (4.8), (5.3), is discontinuous in general —
in spite of it is defined unambiguously and is formulated via continuous functions! Of course
this problem (perhaps imperceptible for a first view) is arisen because of parameter λmin(x, v)
defined by formula (4.7) (or analogous λminS (x, v
S, wS) by (5.2)) which vanishes in an open area
x ∈ A(X): 〈∇ui(xi), xi − ωi〉 > 0 for all i but in general it is non-zero on its boundary, i.e.,
at the points (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ A(X) where 〈∇ui(xi), xi − ωi〉 = 0 at least for one i. Thus the
law of proper contractual trajectory is described via differential equation with a discontinuous
right hand part. Moreover in such a case already the concept of solution requires an accurate
definition. Solution is a continuous function of time, which satisfies the law of trajectory change
for almost all time moments. The solution of this kind defines a contractual trajectory in an
appropriate way.
Notice that classical theorems on existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence over initial
data cannot be applied to equations with discontinuous right hand parts since their right parts
do not obey Lipshitz condition. However by now there is a theory of equations of this type in
which appropriate theorems (on existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence) have proven
and these theorems are applicable to equations describing contractual processes, see Filippov
(1985).
6.2. Price process, associated with a contractual trajectory
The purpose of this paragraph is to discuss available opportunities to connect with a contractual
trajectory some parallel dual price process. This idea seems to be rather tempting, since being
successfully realized, it would allow us, on the one hand, better to reveal interrelations and
peculiarities of contractual trajectories with processes known in the literature (first of all with
taˆtonnement) and, on the other hand, it is impossible to wave away from the fact, that in
real economy the barter processes are going mainly with use of money, which are exchanged on
goods and services in proportions given by prices. A quest about an appropriate price dynamics
is also important for better understanding of how markets function. However the realization
(successful) of this idea encounters with some difficulties. A possible approach to realize the
idea will be discussed below.
The most natural way to define current prices p(t) is to take the prices as a vector, specifying
exchange proportions in the current barter contract. It would be not bad, if economy has only
two goods and, if in the bargain only two individuals have been participated. Really, then if first
agent receives from the contract a vector (v1, v2), where v1 > 0 and v2 < 0, it means that 2-nd
good exchanges on 1-st in proportion −v1/v2, i.e., (normalized) vector of prices can be chosen
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as p = (1,− v1
v2
). This vector is possible to determine via an equivalent way, from equations:
〈(v1, v2), (p1, p2)〉 = 0, p1 = 1.
This property, equality to zero of scalar product of a vector of the prices on vectors of commodi-
ties flows vi, received by the individuals from contract v = (vi)I , together with normalization,
is the crucial requirement for determination of a price vector in this approach. However, in
a general case it is possible to find vector of the prices unequivocally, only if the rank of sys-
tem of vectors {vi}I given by contract v is equal l − 1 (l is the number of goods), i.e., if
rank({vi}I) = l − 1. On the other hand, other contracts may coexist at current time mo-
ment, and, moreover contracts signed in the past and existing now should also participate in
“determination of proportions of an exchange”. As a result, for aggregated proper-contractual
trajectory the given approach yields the system of equations:
〈p(t), xi(t)− ωi〉 = 0, ∀ i ∈ I, t ≥ 0. (6.2)
At the same time, for a coalition trajectory the similar system takes a form:
〈p(t), vSi (t)〉 = 0, ∀ i ∈ S, ∀S ∈ K, t ≥ 0. (6.3)
Moreover, in both cases it should be carried out some normalizing condition, for example,
p1(t) = 1.
Clearly, that it is absolutely not certain, that the specified systems has an unique solution:
the system can be unsolvable or, contrary, it may have infinity many solutions. However in
such case it is possible to try as the prices to take some approximating solution. Certainly, it is
necessary to do in some regular way, so that a trajectory p(t), t ≥ 0 has “not bad” mathematical
properties. Having this in mind one can use known methods of a finding of approximating
solution, for example, the method of least squares. In so doing so-called “generalized inverse
matrix” is entered into consideration, which exists and is unique for any rectangular matrix.
Let us pay attention to this method.
Let us consider a system of the linear equations with some rectangular matrix:
Ax = b.
An approximating solution of system can be found with the help of generalized inverse matrix
A+ as x = A+b, and, if system is overdetermined (a number of independent equations is more
than unknown variables), this gives a solution by a method of the least squares. Then, if a
rank of matrix is equal to the number of columns, (AtA)−1 exists (this is Grama matrix) and
matrix A+ can be fond as
A+ = (AtA)−1At.
In a general case the matrix A+ is set via the following four conditions:
AA+A = A; A+AA+ = A+; A+A & AA+ symmetrical.
These conditions completely determine a matrix A+ and were offered by Penrose (Penrose,
1955), which has also proved existence and uniqueness of a matrix A+. This problem was
considered also in Moore’s works and papers of other authors, this is why one can meet in the
literature the name “Moore-Penrose inverse” (see Greene, 1993 and Searle, Hausman, 1970).
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In a general case the matrix A+ also has formula representation (see Greene, 1993, p. 45), that
in particular allows to conclude continuously-differential character of the solution.
So, if to apply a generalized inverse matrix associated price process p(t) to an aggregated
trajectory can be determined as
p(t) = A+e1, e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0),
where the matrix A of dimension (n + 1) × l, with rows ak, k = 1, . . . , n + 1 which are equal:
a1 = e1 and ak = xk−1(t)− ωk−1, k ≥ 2, accordingly.
For a coalitional trajectory associated price process p(t) can be set by the same formula, in
which, however, the matrix A has dimension (
∑
S∈K |S|+1)× l, first row a1 = e1, and all other
are indexed by pairs (i, S), i ∈ S ∈ K and coincide with vectors vSi .
For a proper-contractual trajectory it is also possible to try to determine price process as the
differential equation.
Really, for an aggregated trajectory, formal differentiation by time system (6.2) (notwithstand-
ing that it may have not the exact solution!), with the account (4.8), (6.2) yields
〈p˙(t), xi(t)− ωi〉+ p(t)x˙i = 0 ⇒ 〈p˙(t), xi(t)− ωi〉 = −p(t)[λmin(x, v)(xi(t)− ωi) + vi] ⇒
〈p˙(t), ωi − xi(t)〉 = p(t)vi(x), ∀ i ∈ I, p˙1(t) = 0. (6.4)
Further, applying a generalized inverse matrix the system (6.4) can be approximately solved
relative to p˙(t) and can be written in an explicit form. It is possible also to try to solve systems
(6.2), (6.4) jointly and find a direct dependence of p˙(t) from current consumptions x(t) and an
exogenous trade rule v(x).
The similar actions can be made for a coalitional trajectory. Really, differentiating system
(6.3), by virtue of Definition 5.1, items (ii), (iii), and applying (6.3), in the case when a new
contract wS is signed by a coalition S ∈ Υ(t) we find
〈p˙(t), vSi 〉+ p(t)v˙Si = 0 ⇒ 〈p˙(t), vSi 〉 = −p(t)[λminS (x, vS, wS)vSi + wSi ] ⇒
〈p˙(t), vSi (t)〉 = −p(t)wSi (x), ∀ i ∈ S, p˙1(t) = 0. (6.5)
In all other cases (the breaking of contract or when a coalition is passive) we obtain
〈p˙(t), vSi (t)〉 = 0, ∀ i ∈ S.
What preliminary conclusions and observations can be done about suggested variant of price
process?
1) The current prices are determined as an average (approximate) vector of exchange propor-
tions over all (gross) contracts, signed and saved (i.e. unbroken) during contractual process
up to the current time moment. It seems that it corresponds to economic intuition on how,
in mass manner, the individuals can find the prices acting in the real markets. For example,
similar method is used for a finding of market price for the objects of real estate.
2) We need the analysis of price process to be continued at least for some particular model
examples. Moreover, it seems us that an opportunity to apply price process for a finding of
suitable Lyapunov’s function has to be analyzed, to achieve the basic purpose of the project
and to establish convergence of proper-contractual process, at least in limited frameworks.
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3) Now it is not quite not clear, how suggested price process is connected with Walrasian
taˆtonnement. However it is possible to show, that in economy with two agents and two goods
the associated price process is practically equivalent to Walrasian taˆtonnement. Moreover, if
the trajectory converges to equilibrium allocation then it is simple to prove that price process
converges to the equilibrium prices.
4) It is possible to consider modifications of described price process, even essentially different
price processes, with the purpose to find variant interrelated with the different points of view.
For example, it seems tempting to study still non-described idea (now it is not elaborated yet):
to put into correspondence to contractual process some optimal control problem, which has
a contractual trajectory as an optimal solution. Then one can try to find price process from
necessary conditions of optimality.
7. CONTRACTUAL PROCESS IN 2× 2 ECONOMY
Before the starting to describe obtained results we consider two particular examples of economy
with two individuals and two commodities. These examples are interesting because they reveal
in Edgeworth box the geometrical course of contractual processes with partial breaking of
contracts. One can easily observe that our process is convergent in these cases.
Further an agent is called active at a current time moment t if he/she realizes an breaking of
aggregated contract at this moment of time.
7.1. Two examples
Now we consider two particular examples of economy with two individuals and two commodities.
These examples are interesting because they reveal in Edgeworth box the geometrical course
of contractual processes with partial breaking of contracts. One can easily observe that our
process is convergent in these cases.
For both examples positive orthant in 2-dimensional plane presents individual consumption sets,
i.e., Xi = R2+, i = 1, 2. The examples are differentiated via agents’ utilities and endowments.
Example 7.1 (Cobb–Douglas utilities). Let preferences be presented by Cobb-Douglas
utilities in logarithmic form as follows
u1(x1, x2) =
1
4
ln x1 +
3
4
ln x2, u2(y1, y2) =
3
4
ln y1 +
1
4
ln y2.
Consider also the following initial endowments:
ω = (ω1, ω2) = ((
9
10
,
1
10
), (
1
10
,
9
10
)), ω¯ = ω1 + ω2 = (1, 1).
Then indifference curves for first and second individual going across initial endowments point
ω1 in 1st agent’s coordinate system are described by equations:
x2 =
1
10
(
9
10x1
) 1
3
, x2 = 1− 9
10
(
1
10(1− x1)
)3
.
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Fig. 2. Contractual process in economy with 2 agents and Cobb–Douglas utilities
Calculations show that Pareto boundary is a curve determined by equation
x2 =
9x1
1 + 8x1
, 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1.
Finally, a maximal surface is composed via two curves and it is the low envelope for them:
x2 =
(
3x1
40x1 − 9
)
, x1 >
9
40
& x2 =
(
28− 31x1
37− 40x1
)
, x1 <
28
31
.
An illustration of this example in Edgeworth box is given in Fig. 2.
In considered case proper contractual process is convergent to unique equilibrium (( 1
4
, 3
4
), (3
4
, 1
4
)).
This is developed in the following way: if its trajectory is in limits of maximal surface (shaded
area of Fig. 2), then individuals are cooperated and signed some barter contracts giving a rise
of utilities. A current consumption point is moving this way as long as it stars to leave the
maximal surface limits. If a new contract starts to lead the point behind maximal surface and
new position is under control of 1st agent (we call him ‘active’ in contractual process), this is
the left low part of box restricted by budget line, then this agent partially breaks aggregated
contract and a current point of trajectory is projected onto maximal surface along to straight
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 42
line going at initial endowments point. Analogous thing takes place for second agent if a new
contract leads the point to the area under 2nd agent control (right upper part of box behind the
budget line). As it is shown in figure in both cases next point of trajectory moves over maximal
surface and approaches to equilibrium. Thus in the limit our trajectory achieves equilibrium
allocation where 1st agent consumption is ( 1
4
, 3
4
).
The following example is well known in literature and presents an economy with multiplicity
of equilibria.
Example 7.2 (Exponential utilities). Let preferences be determined by the following util-
ities functions:
u1(x1, x2) = x1 − 100e
−x2
10 , u2(y1, y2) = y2 − 110e
−y1
10 .
Let ω = (ω1, ω2) = ((40, 0), (0, 50)) be an initial endowments allocation. Now the indifference
curves of both agents going across endowments are defined by equations
x2 = −10 ln
(
x1 + 60
100
)
, x2 = 110− 110e
x1−40
10 .
Pareto boundary is a straight line defined as
x2 = x1 − 40 + 10 ln 110.
Maximal surface is composed by means of two curves, relative to 1st and 2nd agents:
x1 = 40− 10x2e
−x2
10 , x2 = 11(40− x1)e
x1−40
10 .
There are three equilibrium allocations, A, B, C, where 1st agent consumption bundles are the
following:
x(1) ≈ (3.2212, 10.226), x(2) ≈ (13.17211, 20.1769), x(3) ≈ (32.2579, 39.2627).
An illustration of this example in Edgeworth box is given in Fig. 3. Contractual process is
developed similar to described above: in the limits of maximal surface agents sign mutually
beneficial contracts as long as an allocation behind area restricted by maximal surface is reached.
On the other hand then a trajectory tends to leave maximal surface area and a current point
is under control of 1st agent (he is active, this touch-dotted line in figure), the agent partially
breaks aggregated contract so that the point is projected onto maximal surface along a straight
line going across current point and initial endowments one. The similar thing takes place for
the points under 2nd agent control. One can see in figure that the next value of trajectory
is moved over maximal surface to be closely to one of equilibrium: in the area of 1st agent
activity to C, in the area of 2nd agent to A. Finally, if trajectory “attempts to leave” the limits
of maximal surface and is placed exactly on the straight line linked B and initial endowments
then trajectory is finished at the point B.
So we see that in this example the multiplicity of equilibria does not impede contractual process
to be convergent. Moreover one can correctly speak about locally stable (A, C) and unstable
(B) equilibria relative to contractual processes.
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Fig. 3. Contractual process in economy with 2 agents and Exponential utilities
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7.2. Analysis of contractual processes in 2× 2 economies
The geometry of contractual trajectories in the considered examples says us that at least in
economy with two individuals and two goods the contractual process has to converge to equi-
librium under rather general assumptions. Really, in addition to imposed above assumption
(S) that model is smooth we only need to require Pi(ωi) ⊂ intXi, i = 1, 2, that together with
(S) actually provides the coincidence of proper contractual allocations with equilibrium ones.
To prove this hypothesis, let us consider some contractual trajectory x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t)),
t ∈ [0, +∞) satisfying to Definition 4.1 and defined via some rule of trade
vI : A(X)→ Lc = {(v1, v2) ∈ (R2)I | v1 + v2 = 0}.
As soon as economy has only two agents and I = {1, 2} a sole coalition in which an exchange
of commodities may be realized, then trading rule consists of unique map vI(·), where upper
index I can be omitted. By definition v2(x) = −v1(x), ∀x ∈ A(X) and it is enough to set
only function v1 : R2+ → R2, where the vector (v1(x1),−v1(x1)) = vI(x1) is associated with the
instant contract, which is signed the members of coalition {1, 2} at the moment t ∈ [0, +∞)
provided that a current allocation is x(t) = (x1, x2), x2 = ω1 + ω2 − x1. In addition, this
function should be continuous and to define mutually beneficial contract v = vI(x1): v 6= 0 if
and only if
∃ ν ∈ Lc : ui(xi + νi) > ui(xi), i = 1, 2 & ∂viui(xi) > 0, i = 1, 2.
In other words, if there is at least one opportunity for a mutually beneficial exchange, then one
of variants of such exchange should be realized in the form of the mutually beneficial contract;
the contract can be zero only if there are no opportunities for a mutually beneficial exchange
of commodities.
For contractual process in economy with two individuals only two following alternatives can be
realized.
(i) There is an individual such that since some moment τ , almost everywhere on [τ, +∞),
only he/she can be active (probably both are passive); thus utility of this individual
monotonously does not decrease along a trajectory, i.e., for example for the first agent,
it has to be
u1(x1(t
′) ≥ u1(x1(t), ∀ t′ ≥ t ≥ τ.
(ii) The case described in (i) is not true, i.e, there are monotonously increasing sequences
t′k+1 > t
′
k, t
′′
k+1 > t
′′
k, k ∈ N, t′k → +∞, t′′k → +∞ when k → +∞, such that at the
moments t′k the 1st individual is active, and t
′′
k are the moments of 2nd agent activity,
k = 1, 2, . . . Thus, utilities of both individuals can oscillate, growing and decreasing, and
this situation does not change when time elapses.
Analysis of alternatives (i), (ii) is realized in two subsequent lemmas. The first establishes that
if alternative (i) is true then every limit point of a contractual trajectory is Pareto optimal.
The second alternative causes the greatest difficulties and second lemma states that in some
sense there is the monotonicity of utilities along a trajectory but it has “piecewise” character.
Lemma 7.1. Let alternative (i) be fulfilled. Then each limit point of a contractual trajectory
is Pareto optimal. Hence, every interior limit point is equilibrium one.
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The proof of Lemma 7.1 is placed in Appendices.
Remark 7.1. One can easy to see from the proof that this lemma is also true for economy with
any number of agents and commodities. It is important only, that alternative (i) is fulfilled.
Moreover, if economy has only two agents and alternative (i) is true then it is easy to prove
that all limit points have equal utilities for both agents, that for strictly concave functions is
possible only if allocations are equal (see the first part of Theorem 7.1 proof).
Remark 7.2. From the proof of Lemma 7.1 and due to Remark 7.1 one can also conclude
convergence of contractual process without break of contracts. However now it will be conver-
gence to some Pareto optimal allocation: it is obvious, that the limit point is not obliged to be
equilibrium since it is not a limit point of allocations which are stable relative to partial break
of gross contract. However when utilities are strictly concave there is only one limit point,
that easily follows from the fact of coincidence of utility (follows from monotonicity along a
trajectory) for all individuals in all limit points.
Lemma 7.2. Let alternative (ii) be fulfilled. Then there are exist two monotonously in-
creasing sequences of the moments of time τ ik, for i = 1, 2, such that τ
1
k < τ
2
k < τ
1
k+1,
〈∇ui(xi(τ ik)), xi(τ ik)− ωi〉 = 0, i = 1, 2, ∀ k ∈ N and
ui(xi(τ
i
k)) < ui(xi(τ)) < ui(xi(τ
i
k+1)), ∀ τ ∈ (τ ik, τ ik+1), i = 1, 2 (7.1)
holds.
The proof of Lemma 7.2 is placed in Appendices. The contents of this lemma is illustrated
in Figures 4, 5. Fig. 4 demonstrates dynamics of utility for sequences of time moments τ ik,
i = 1, 2, k = 1, 2, . . . constructed in the proof and described in Lemma 7.2. Possible and
impossible dynamics of proper-contractual trajectories are demonstrated in Fig. 5; there is
shown, that the only fragment of trajectory, represented in the top part of figure is possible —
all other variants result to an impossible cycle contradicting with the choice of the moments τ ik.
The main result of the section is the following theorem on convergence of contractual trajectories
to equilibrium in economy with two agents and two goods.
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Theorem 7.1. Let economy have two agents and two commodities. Let utilities be smooth,
strictly concave and non-satiated on R2+. Then for any continuous trading rule the contrac-
tual trajectory by Definition 4.1 converges to some proper-contractual allocation. Hence, in
conditions when equilibrium allocations coincide with proper-contractual ones, every proper-
contractual trajectory converges to equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 7.1. In conditions of the theorem the considered above alternatives (i), (ii)
take place. So, it is enough to show, that for any alternative the contractual process converges
to proper-contractual allocation.
Let alternative (i) be true. Let’s prove, that x1(t) converges to x˜1 when t → +∞. To do it
let’s assume, that the trajectory has two different limit points x˜1 = (x˜11, x˜
1
2), x˜
2 = (x˜21, x˜
2
2) and
x˜1 6= x˜2. Due to Lemma 7.1 both of them are Pareto optimal and thus u1(x˜11) = u1(x˜21). Let’s
assume, for example, that u2(x˜
1
2) ≤ u2(x˜22). Further consider any allocation represented as a
convex combination of the given limit points with strictly positive coefficients, for example one
can take x˜′ = 1
2
x˜1 + 1
2
x˜2. Now, by virtue of strict concavity of utility functions conclude
u(x˜′) u(x˜1) ⇐⇒ u1(x˜′1) > u1(x˜11), u2(x˜′2) > u2(x˜12),
that contradicts Pareto optimality of allocation x˜1. Thus all limit points of a trajectory coincide
and, hence, the trajectory converges.
Further we analyze alternative (ii). With this purpose one can apply Lemma 7.2 and consider
limit points of sequences {x1(τ 1k )}k∈IN and {x1(τ 2k )}k∈IN. Without lost of generality one can
think that these sequences converge itself. Determine
x˜11 = lim
k→∞
x1(τ
1
k ), x˜
1
2 = ω1 + ω2 − x˜11, x˜21 = lim
k→∞
x1(τ
2
k ), x˜
2
2 = ω1 + ω2 − x˜21.
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In view of (7.1) we have
u1(x˜
1
1) = sup
t≥τ12
u1(x1(t)) = u1(x˜
2
1), u2(x˜
1
2) = sup
t≥τ12
u2(x2(t)) = u2(x˜
2
2).
It is clear, that point x˜11 is on the maximal surface of 1st agent and x˜
2
2 is on the maximal surface
of 2nd, and that for both individuals the allocations are equivalent by utility. Further we shall
show, that actually coincide not only utilities, but also allocations, i.e. x˜11 = x˜
2
1. For two-goods
economy this allocation will be obviously proper-contractual (equilibrium) since it is on the
maximal surface of every agent.30
Let’s assume now that x˜11 6= x˜21. These points are on a common indifference curve of 1st agent,
and, accordingly, the points x˜12 6= x˜22 are on an indifference curve of 2nd individual. Reasoning
in Edgeworth box, for example in coordinate system of 1st agent, we see that two points x˜11 6= x˜21
are connected by two continuous curves which are the pieces of boundary of two (convex) sets
of a utility level. Let’s connect the specified points by a linear segment, i.e., consider the set
{γx˜11 + (1− γ)x˜21 | 0 < γ < 1}. By virtue of strict concavity of utility functions, the value of
utility at points of this segment is strictly more than utility level at its ends for both individuals.
This implies that for one of agents the part of indifference curve, going through the points x˜11,
x˜21 and placed strictly between these points, cannot intersect maximal surface of the agent,
see Fig. 6 (every ray going from initial endowments through one of considered points first
intersects with one of two indifference curves and then it hits at a point of segment; therefore
30 It is not sufficient in general, but it will be so if the allocation is Pareto optimal.
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(via concavity) when point moves along the ray utility increases at the point of intersection
with indifference curve). Let this be a case of 2nd agent indifference curve. Further for the 2nd
agent indifference curve let us find a point xmax1 where 1st agent utility is maximal, i.e., define
xmax1 from relation
u1(x
max
1 ) = max{u1(x1) | u2(ω1 + ω2 − x1) = u2(ω1 + ω2 − x˜11)}.
Obviously, that in Edgeworth box for 2nd agent indifference curve this point is placed strictly
between points x˜11, x˜
2
1. Further find neighborhoods V1, V2 of points x˜
1
1, x˜
2
1 and a neighborhood
Vmax of point x
max
1 satisfying the following conditions:
1) At every point from Vmax the 1st agent utility is strictly more than his/her utility at any
point from neighborhoods V1, V2;
2) For every point from V1 if the trajectory passes through this point (i.e. it is starting from
this point as a point of initial data in Cauchy problem) then it certainly passes through some
point of neighborhood Vmax.
Clearly that such neighborhoods can be found, since first it is possible to find neighborhoods
satisfying 1) and then if necessary to reduce neighborhoods V1, V2. However now we come to the
contradiction because 1st agent utility is non-monotonically changed in the part of trajectory
where 2nd agent is passive — it contradicts to the property that every contract defined by
trading rule is mutually beneficial.31
8. LOCAL STABILITY IN CONTRACTUAL PROCESSES
In this section we consider the problem of local stability of contractual processes. But first of
all we recall classical definitions.
Let’s consider some autonomous differential equation x˙ = F (x) and let x¯ be its stationary (or
critical, equilibrium) point, i.e. a point for which F (x¯) = 0.32
A stationary point x¯ is called locally stable if for each neighborhood of this point it is possible
to find (another) neighborhood such that the solution of our equation starting from any point of
last neighborhood (initial data in neighborhood) will never leave the limits of first neighborhood.
Formally:
∀ ε > 0 ∃ δ > 0 : if ‖x(0)− x¯‖ < δ, then ‖x(t, x(0))− x¯‖ < ε ∀ t ≥ 0,
31 One can yield a contradiction by a faster way: it is enough to notice, that on a ray, outgoing from ω1 and
passing through the point x˜21, the point of 1st agent utility maximum should settle down “closer” to the point
ω1, rather than similar maximum point for 2nd utility. It follows from the fact that points x˜
1
1, x˜
2
1 are located
on a common 1st agent indifference curve, i.e., u1(x˜
1
1) = u1(x˜
2
1). But it means that x˜
1
1 6= x˜21 is impossible.
Another way to obtain a contradiction is to notice, that a trajectory, starting from a neighborhood of point x˜21
never can get in a neighborhood of x˜11, since for this it has “to overcome” an area of point x
max
1 neighborhood,
in which the vector field of trading rule is oppositely directed.
32 For differential inclusion x˙ ∈ F (x) stationarity condition has the form 0 ∈ F (x¯). However by virtue of
specific properties of inclusion x˙ ∈ F (x) corresponding to contractual processes condition 0 ∈ F (x¯) is equivalent
to {0} = F (x¯).
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Fig. 7. Locally stable a) and unstable b) equilibrium x¯
where x(t, x(0)) is the solution of the Cauchy problem with an initial point x(0) ∈ domF .
However for our case it is not sufficient to have only ordinary stability it is also necessary that
in the limit current allocation becomes equilibrium one (because we are interested in converging
processes). Formally, in addition it is necessary to require the following:
lim
t→+∞
x(t, x(0)) = x¯, ∀x(0) : ‖x(0)− x¯‖ < δ.
Thus, speaking about local stability of contractual process we mean local asymptotical stability.
Similar definitions are given for the case of differential inclusions.
As usual, we begin our analysis from the study of 2× 2 economy case. It is rather simple case
and one can obtain a characterization of locally stable equilibria already from the analysis of
diagrams 7 a), b). In these diagrams (in the style of Edgeworth box) instead of projection onto
agents’ maximal surfaces there is shown the projection onto tangent hyperplane to maximal
surface at equilibrium point x¯ that is correct for the local analysis. The only difference between
cases a) and b) is actually that we have renumbered the tangent hyperplanes determined by
vectors hi, i = 1, 2 calculated at a point x¯. However this changed the case radically: locally
stable equilibrium has turned into unstable! As it is shown in Fig. 7 some current points x′,
x′′ are approaching to equilibrium but after change of surfaces numeration they are moving off
from equilibrium as it is shown in 7 b). Thus one can notice that in local stability the key role
is played by an inter-location of vectors h1, h2 and p concerning equilibrium point. Moreover
this allows us to formulate a hypothesis for the work: an equilibrium is stable if (locally) every
current consumption of active individual is strictly less preferable of his/her consumption in
equilibrium. This hypothesis is fulfilled for the situations similar described in diagram 7 a)
and is violated for 7 b). For 2 × 2 economy it is possible strictly to prove the validity of our
hypothesis. However already for the 3 goods economy this hypothesis becomes rather doubtful.
Really, the considerations below show that for economy with two agents and 3 commodities
our hypothesis can be true only in some degenerated cases.
Let’s consider economy with two individuals and with commodity space of dimension l ≥ 3.
Let x ∈ Rl+ denotes the 1st individual consumption and y ∈ Rl+ is applied to denote 2nd agent
consumption and let preferences be defined via Cobb–Douglas functions:
u1(x) =
l∏
j=1
x
αj
j , α 0,
∑
αj = 1, u2(y) =
l∏
j=1
y
βj
j , β  0,
∑
βj = 1.
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Let ωi  0, i = 1, 2 be some initial endowments. It is well known, that in such economy there
is an unique equilibrium which we denote by (x¯, y¯). Let’s show that in every neighborhood of
this equilibrium there are points (x, y) (allocations) such that an individual, say 1st, is active
and the 2nd individual is passive, i.e. 〈∇u1(x), x − ω1〉 = 0 & 〈∇u2(y), y − ω2〉 > 0, and in
addition u1(x) > u1(x¯).
With this purpose let us any allocation (x˜, y˜) such that only 1st individual is active and
u1(x˜) > u1(x¯). Such allocations in 3 goods economy do exist (computer finds them in particular
examples) though they are absent in two-goods economy. Further, reasoning in Edgeworth we
can connect by linear segment points x˜ and x¯ and show, that the points from the segment
interior are strictly inside of maximal surface. It follows from the fact, that for Cobb–Douglas
functions the restriction 〈∇u1(x), x−ω1〉 ≥ 0 is a restriction defined by concave function (thus
the set of allocations limited by the maximal surface is convex). Really, for simplicity taking
the logarithm of utility and calculating a gradient, we find
〈∇ ln u1(x), x− ω1〉 = 1−
∑ αjω1j
xj
,
where in the right hand part of equality a strict concave function is written down. It follows
from this that if from the point of initial endowments ω1 to let out a ray going through some
point of segment x(γ) = γx˜ + (1− γ)x¯, γ ∈ (0, 1) then the point of intersection of the ray and
the 1st agent maximal surface is placed on the ray further than point x(γ). Thus, the 1st agent
utility at a point of intersection is greater than his/her utility at a point x(γ), which in turn is
more than his/her utility at a point of equilibrium. So, we have shown that in all points which
are located on a continuous curve on the maximal surface, it is constructed as all points of its
intersection with all designed rays, the 1st agent utility is strictly more than utility at a point of
equilibrium. It denies our working hypothesis since if it is incorrect already for Cobb–Douglas
utilities then in general it cannot be considered acceptable.
So, in formulated above form our characteristic property for an equilibrium to be locally stable
relative to general contractual processes is unsatisfactory. One of opportunities to elaborate
positive result is to relax the stability requirement and to require (local) convergence not for any
rule of trade but for the rules having some additional and economically reasonable properties.
With this in mind we first try to understand better what is the basic distinction between
2-goods and 3-goods economies.
In 2-goods case and for a small enough neighborhood of an equilibrium point, if the current
allocation is on the maximal surface, then any mutually beneficial exchange between the agents
with necessity (almost always) involves the break of gross contract, i.e., contractual process
goes with obligatory break of contracts. Differently, if the current point of a trajectory is placed
in a neighborhood of stable equilibrium then process further goes according to alternative (i)
of previous paragraph: when time elapsed there can be only one active individual and his/her
current consumption is strictly less preferable of equilibrium one (hence, using results of the
previous paragraph one can easy establish convergence of a trajectory to equilibrium). This
statement is true as soon as for a small enough neighborhood of equilibrium the normalized
gradients of utility functions are almost equal to the vector of equilibrium prices but the vectors
hi, i = 1, 2 being calculated at equilibrium are disproportionate to equilibrium prices. However
already in 3-goods economy it is not so, and in any neighborhood of equilibrium one can find an
allocation on the maximal surface admitting a mutually beneficial exchange without break of
contracts, i.e., it is possible Pareto–improvement without break! This motivates the following
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Definition 8.1. A rule of trade v : A(X)→ Lc is called benevolent, if v(x) does not attract
the break of contracts in all situations when a mutually beneficial exchange without break is
possible.
Contractual UB–process is called benevolent, if it is defined by a benevolent rule of trade.
In substantial terms Definition 8.1 means that before the individuals sign a new contract, they
carefully investigate opportunities for a mutually beneficial exchange being aimed to find a
contract without subsequent break of made earlier contracts. The signing of a contract with
subsequent break is carried out only if there is no any other opportunity to get an agreement.
Formally, for process by Definition 4.1 the concept of a benevolent rule of trade requires per-
formance of the following conditions.
Let x ∈ A(X) be some allocation stable relative to the break of aggregated contract x − ω
and let
Ia(x) = {i ∈ I | 〈∇ui(xi), xi − ωi〉 = 0} 6= ∅
be nonempty set of all active individuals. Let us define
W fr(x) = {w ∈ Lc | 〈∇ui(xi), wi〉 > 0, ∀ i ∈ I & 〈hi, wi〉 > 0, ∀ i ∈ Ia(x)}. (8.1)
This is the set (possible empty) of all mutually beneficial contracts that being signed do not
attract the break of aggregated contract x− ω.33 If W fr(x) 6= ∅ then
〈hi, vi(x)〉 ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ Ia(x) & 〈∇ui(xi), vi(x)〉 > 0, ∀ i ∈ I. (8.2)
The following statement gives some criterion of local stability in economy with two agents.
Proposition 8.1. Let x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2) be an isolated equilibrium allocation in economy with two
agents and let standard assumptions be satisfied. Then if for some neighborhood Vx¯ in A(X) of
point x¯ for every y ∈ Vx¯ satisfying 〈∇ui(yi), yi − ωi〉 ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 the following relation
[∃ j : 〈∇uj(yj), yj − ωi〉 = 0 & W fr(y) = ∅] ⇒ uj(yj) ≤ uj(x¯j) (8.3)
holds, then equilibrium is locally stable relative to (locally) benevolent contractual processes.
Note that in the left hand part of relation (8.3) it is described a situation for which a mutually
beneficial exchange without the subsequent break is impossible. Thus, the requirement (8.3)
tells us that in such cases an active individual prefers equilibrium consumption to current one;
the last can also be written down as 〈∇uj(yj), x¯j − yj〉 > 0 for x¯j 6= yj (it follows from strict
concavity of utility). The proof of Proposition 8.1 is placed in Appendices.
Remark 8.1. Notice that for 2-goods economy an equilibrium x¯ is isolated if vectors h1, h2
calculated at the equilibrium point are non-collinear. Moreover under assumption (S) and if
equilibrium is an interior point then it is possible to prove that any contractual process in 2×2
33 Here Lc = {(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ EI |
∑
I vi = 0} is the space of contracts. Remember that condition 〈hi(x), wi〉 ≥ 0
means that individual i ∈ Ia is not interested in the break of contract x− ω when w is signed at a state x.
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economy is locally benevolent. To see this it is enough to note that for any allocation y on the
maximal surface and from a neighborhood of equilibrium a cone of improvements
z ∈ R2 | 〈∇u1(y1), z〉 > 0 & 〈∇u2(y2), z〉 < 0
does not intersect a half-plane 〈h1(y1), z〉 ≤ 0 when 1st agent is active, or does not intersect
a half-plane 〈h2(y2), z〉 ≥ 0 when 2nd agent is active. It will be so since in a neighborhood of
equilibrium the utility gradients are close to the equilibrium prices and in view of hi(yi) ≈ hi(x¯i),
〈hi(x¯i), ωi − x¯i〉 > 0, i = 1, 2.
Thus Proposition 8.1 quite corresponds with our previous reasonings and serves their formal
proof. Moreover this allows us to formulate a computable criterion of local stability for equi-
librium in economy 2× 2.
In presented form it is not easy to extend the result of Proposition 8.1 to the case of any number
of agents because the fact that economy has only two agents is essential in the proof. Really,
if there are only two individuals and one of them is active in a current state from a suitable
neighborhood of equilibrium then one can conclude that for benevolent trajectories the utility
of passive agent is strictly more than his/her utility in equilibrium. If there are more than
one passive individual then one can surely assert only that among them there is at least one
individual with strictly greater utility than in equilibrium.
Despite of difficulties to study the general case of local stability, in the following section we shall
continue investigation of benevolent proper-contractual processes. Under certain assumptions
it will be proved that these processes generically converge to equilibrium.
9. CONVERGENCE OF BENEVOLENT UB-PROCESSES
We begin the analysis from detailed research of a general case of benevolent trajectories. With
this in mind we first study situations in which a mutually beneficial exchange without break of
contracts is impossible. The following lemma describes necessary conditions that such situation
takes place for some allocation.
Lemma 9.1. Let x ∈ riA(X) be an allocation stable relative to the partial break of gross
contract x − ω. Let standard assumptions be satisfied and let mutually beneficial exchange
without the subsequent break of contracts is impossible, i.e. W fr(x) = ∅. Then there exists a
vector p 6= 0 so that for each individual i ∈ I there are numbers αi ≥ 0, βi ≥ 0 such that
p = αi∇ui(xi) + βihi(xi), ∀ i ∈ I (9.1)
and the following complementarity slackness conditions
βi · 〈∇ui(xi), xi − ωi〉 = 0, ∀ i ∈ I
are fulfilled.
Complementarity slackness conditions appeared in this lemma just serve a convenient form to
describe the fact that for each passive individual (if 〈∇ui(xi), xi − ωi〉 > 0) the value βi ≥ 0
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should be zero while for an active agent (if 〈∇ui(xi), xi − ωi〉 = 0) it can be strictly more than
zero. Further, it is easy to see that up to normalization of p the values αi and βi in the formula
(9.1) are unequivocally defined since ∇ui(xi) and hi(xi) are the non-collinear couple of vectors
for any active individual in the current allocation. It allows us among the active individuals
correctly to identify the agents who can really influence a course of contractual process via a
break of the contracts.
So, we shall call an active individual i really active, if βi > 0. Accordingly, if βi = 0 for an
active agent then he/she may be called as fictitiously active (locally in process behavior of
these individuals similar to passive ones). Also let’s name the individual really passive, if
he/she is passive or fictitiously active.
Proof of Lemma 9.1. By definition (8.1) of the set W fr(x) one can equivalently to rewrite
condition W fr(x) = ∅ in the following way.
Let us define Bi(x) = {z ∈ E | 〈∇ui(xi), z〉 > 0} if the individual i is passive and let Bi(x) =
{z ∈ E | 〈∇ui(xi), z〉 > 0 & 〈hi(xi), z〉 > 0} for the active individual. Then
∏
I
Bi(x) ∩ Lc = ∅,
where, remember Lc = {(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ EI |
∑
I vi = 0} is the space of contracts. Notice that
Bi(x) 6= ∅ for active i since ∇ui(xi) 6= 0, 〈∇ui(xi), xi − ωi〉 = 0 and 〈hi, xi − ωi〉 < 0 (hence
vectors are non-collinear), and of course Bi(x) 6= ∅ for passive agents. Therefore one can apply
separation theorem and find pi = (p1, . . . , pn) 6= 0 such that
〈pi,
∏
I
Bi(x)〉 ≥ 〈pi, Lc〉.
We see that functional pi is bounded from above on subspace Lc which is possible only if
〈pi, Lc〉 = 0 and, therefore, in standard manner one can conclude that pi = pj, ∀ i 6= j. Denote
p = pi 6= 0. Further, it is easy to see that 〈pi,
∏
I Bi(x)〉 ≥ 0 is possible only if (applying
pi = (p, . . . , p))
〈p,Bi(x)〉 > 0, ∀ i ∈ I
is true. Thus, for every active i the inequality 〈p, z〉 > 0 is a corollary of two inequalities:
〈∇ui(xi), z〉 > 0, 〈hi(xi), z〉 > 0, and for passive agent only of first of them. Now applying
Farkas lemma (or again separation theorem) we conclude the existence of αi ≥ 0, βi ≥ 0
demanded in the statement of lemma.
The property of a trajectory to be benevolent is rather qualified requirement which is applied
to a rule of trade. In particular, it is easy to see that the vector p which existence was proved
in Lemma 9.1 being normalized as ‖p‖ = 1 is continuous function of the current point of a
trajectory.
Lemma 9.2. Let x(t), t ≥ 0 be a benevolent UB-trajectory by Definition 4.1 and let standard
assumptions be satisfied. Then the vector p = p(x(t)), ‖p‖ = 1, existing by Lemma 9.1 at all
points of trajectory x(t) where beneficial exchange without contracts breaking is impossible is
continuous function in its domain.
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It is clear, that in lemma conditions when there is the specified continuous dependence of
a vector p from the current point of a trajectory, the same thing can be said about the
coefficients αi, βi of decomposition (9.1): they are also continuously depend on time. It follows
from the fact (already mentioned) that vectors ∇ui, hi being calculated at required points are
non-collinear.
Proof of Lemma 9.2. It follows from the continuity of a trajectory x(t) that for each individual
i the set of all moments t > 0 where he/she is passive is open on interval (0, +∞), because
the set is defined via condition 〈∇ui(xi(t)), xi(t) − ωi〉 > 0. Due to Lemma 9.1 we have
p(x(t)) = ∇ui(xi(t))/‖∇ui(xi(t))‖ in every moment t where individual i is passive. Therefore,
since the gradient of utility continuously depends on trajectory points one can conclude that
as the function of time p(t) changes continuously in a neighborhood of t. Now we need to show
that if x˙(t) 6= 0, i.e., if the point x(t) is not equilibrium, and if the mutually beneficial exchange
without break is impossible then a passive individual does exist. Assuming that all individuals
are active via (9.1) (the mutually beneficial exchange without break is impossible) we have
p(t) = αi∇ui(xi(t)) + βihi(xi(t)), ∀ i ∈ I.
Further let us multiply these equality on vectors xi(t) − ωi 6= 0 and then sum the received
equalities. As a result, since from the activity of the individuals we have 〈∇ui(xi), xi − ωi〉 = 0,
∀ i ∈ I and due to ∑(xi(t)− ωi) = 0 we obtain
0 =
∑
βi〈hi(xi(t)), xi(t)− ωi〉.
Since βi ≥ 0 and 〈hi(xi), xi − ωi〉 < 0, ∀ i ∈ I, then the last equality is possible only if βi = 0
for all i, that is possible only in equilibrium. It is a contradiction.
Further we will be interested in some specific properties of proper-contractual trajectories by
Definition 4.1 (not necessarily benevolent!). In fact, we need to clear those situations, when
at the points of a trajectory more than one active individual may exist. With this in mind we
remind that at the current point of a trajectory x(t) the measure of break of the gross contract
is defined as a minimum (provided that it is less than zero, otherwise a break does not occurs)
of some values determining desirable break for the active individuals. Desirable break of gross
contract for the agent i is defined by value
λi(x(t), v(x(t))) =
〈hi(xi(t)), vi(xi(t))〉
〈hi(xi(t)), ωi − xi(t)〉 ,
see Lemma 4.1. However for two individuals simultaneously define the size of break of the
contracts in nearest subsequent after t moments of time, it is necessary that the measure of de-
sirable break of gross contract coincides with a general minimum and, therefore, both measures
should coincide among themselves. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 9.1. A contractual trajectory x : [0, +∞) → A(X) (process) is called non-
degenerate if for all non-equilibrium points x(t) of its hit on maximal surface for each couple
of active individual i, j, i 6= j (i.e. if 〈∇ui(xi(t)), xi(t) − ωi〉 = 〈∇uj(xj(t)), xj(t) − ωj〉 = 0)
the following inequality
λi(x(t), v(x(t))) =
〈hi(xi(t)), vi(xi(t))〉
〈hi(xi(t)), ωi − xi(t)〉 6=
〈hj(xj(t)), vj(xj(t))〉
〈hj(xj(t)), ωj − xj(t)〉 = λj(x(t), v(x(t)))
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holds.
A trading rule is called non-degenerate relative to initial endowments allocation ω =
(ω1, . . . , ωn) if a generated trajectory with initial data x(0) = ω is non-degenerate.
Non-degenerate contractual trajectories are easier in the analysis, because in each moment of
time only one individual sets a measure of break of gross contract, i.e. he/she can be considered
to be as an active “leader” of contractual process. However, for non-degenerate processes of a
general form when time elapses there can be a change of the leader. Below we will see that it
does not occur in case of benevolent trajectories.
With this in mind we first show, that for any not stabilized trajectory the set of those moments
where there are two or more active agents has a structure similar to discrete one34.
Lemma 9.3. Let x(t) be a non-degenerate UB-contractual trajectory by Definition 4.1 and 9.1.
Let in the moment τ the derivative x˙(τ) 6= 0 and let an agent i is active, i.e. 〈∇ui(xi(τ)), xi(τ)−
ωi〉 = 0. Then for some ε > 0 and for all points from (τ, τ + ε) only one of the following
alternatives takes place:
(i) If λi(x(τ), v(x(τ))) = λ
min(x(τ), v(x(τ))) < 0 only individual i is active and all other agents
are passive.
(ii) If λi(x(τ), v(x(τ))) = λ
min(x(τ), v(x(τ))) = 0 individual i may be active but it is not
certainly the case however all other agents are certainly passive.
(iii) If λj(x(τ), v(x(τ))) > λ
min(x(τ), v(x(τ))) = 0 for each active individual then in interval
(τ, τ + ε) all agents are passive.
One can find the proof of Lemma 9.3 in Appendices. The statement of this lemma implies the
following important
Corollary 9.1. If a contractual trajectory is non-degenerated and x˙(t) 6= 0, ∀ t ≥ 0, then the
set of all time moments where the number of active individuals can be two or greater is no more
than enumerable.
Remark 9.1. The statement of Lemma 9.3 may seem almost obvious however it is necessary
to remember that we deal with the solution of a differential equation with a discontinuous right
hand part and, therefore, this solution is not obliged to be differentiable function. Therefore
appropriate analysis should be realized with the special carefulness.
It is seemed, that the result of lemma can be extended to a general case of not necessarily non-
degenerate trajectories. Certainly, it has to be another edition in which possible such variant of
alternative (i): from the set all active individuals satisfying to this alternative condition there
may be separated the group of the individuals each of them is active on some open interval of
time directly contiguous to the considered time moment. However the strict proof of this fact is
not presented while... As a consequence to generalized lemma one can hope to receive such fact:
the number of the moments of time, when the set of the active individuals is reconstructed, is
no more than enumerable.
34 Strictly speaking, this set can have limit points, however it does not influence the subsequent analysis.
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Further we show that while equilibrium is not attained along a benevolent trajectory there is
only one individual that can be “really” active. Remember that is we have named really active
such active individual which in the relation (9.1) from Lemma 9.1 has parameter βi 6= 0.
Theorem 9.1. Let x(t) be non-degenerate benevolent trajectory and let standard assumptions
be fulfilled. Then only one of the following alternatives can be true:
(i) There are no (almost) time moments on the interval [0, +∞) when the breaking of gross
contract x(t) − ω is realized, i.e., for almost all time moments during contractual process all
individuals are passive.
(ii) There exists such time moment τ > 0 that for almost all time moments on the interval
[0, τ) all individuals are passive and the contrary at the moment τ : all individuals are active,
i.e., x(τ) is an equilibrium.
(iii) There exist time moments τ1 > 0 and τ2 > τ1 such that for almost all time moments on
the interval [0, τ1) all individuals are passive and there is the only real active individual on the
interval [τ1, τ2) and if τ2 6= +∞ then at the moment τ2 all individuals are active, i.e., x(τ2) is
an equilibrium.
Theorem 9.1 describes rather important properties of non-degenerate benevolent trajectories
which allow us to conclude the convergence of this type trajectories to an equilibrium.
Corollary 9.2. Let the standard assumptions be fulfilled. Then any benevolent rule of trade
generating non-degenerate contractual process defines proper-contractual UB-trajectory, for
which all limit points are equilibria. Thus non-degenerate benevolent processes are quasi-globally
stable.
Proof of Corollary 9.2. If alternative (ii) or (iii) when τ2 < +∞ are realized then the
convergence of a contractual trajectory to equilibrium is obvious. If the alternative (i) or
(iii) with τ2 = +∞ are realized then we are in the condition of alternative (i) from § 7.1 (see
page 44) and now we can apply Lemma 7.1 and Remark 7.1 that proves equilibrium properties
of any limit point.
Proof of Theorem 9.1. Let us determine a time moment τ > 0 as a first moment when the
mutually beneficial exchange without partial break of gross contract x(t) − ω is impossible.
If there are no such moments then alternative (i) is realized. However, if the set of all such
moments is not empty then being the closed set it always has the minimal element. Therefore
moment τ is determined correctly. Further, if x˙(τ) = 0 then x(τ) is an equilibrium and,
therefore, the alternative (ii) is realized. Let x˙(τ) 6= 0. Now we are able to apply Lemma 9.1
and can conclude that at the moment τ there is at least one really active individual. Really,
otherwise βi(τ) = 0 for all i ∈ I that is possible only in equilibrium. Let I ra(τ) ⊂ I be
nonempty set of all really active individuals at the moment τ . Further one can apply the fact
that our trajectory is non-degenerate and show that alternative (i) of Lemma 9.3 is true. We
need to prove that λi(x(τ), v(x(τ))) < 0 for some active individual i ∈ I at the moment τ . To
do it we need to show 〈hi(xi(τ)), vi(xi(τ))〉 < 0. With this in mind one can apply Lemma 9.1
and conclude the existence of a vector p(τ) 6= 0 and, for each i, numbers αi(τ) ≥ 0, βi(τ) ≥ 0
such that (9.1) is carried out:
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p(τ) = αi(τ)∇ui(xi(τ)) + βi(τ)hi(xi(τ)), ∀ i ∈ I.
Further, for each really active individual i from Ira(τ) 6= ∅ multiply the appropriate equality
on vector vi(xi(τ)) and then sum the received equalities. The obtained result can be written
down as
〈p(τ),
∑
Ira(τ)
vi(xi(τ))〉 −
∑
Ira(τ)
αi〈∇ui(xi(τ)), vi(xi(τ))〉 =
=
∑
Ira(τ)
βi(τ)〈hi(xi(τ)), vi(xi(τ))〉.
Since each summand in the right hand part of this equality has a positive factor (strictly
more than zero) we shall receive required property if it will be established that the value in
the left hand part of equality is negative. But it is so because by the definition of contract∑
Ira(τ) vi(xi(τ)) = −
∑
I\Ira(τ) vi(xi(τ)) that in view of its mutual benefit for really passive
individuals gives
〈p(τ),
∑
Ira(τ)
vi(xi(τ))〉 = −〈p(τ),
∑
I\Ira(τ)
vi(xi(τ))〉 < 0.
Therefore, the left hand part of previous equality is the summation of negative and non-positive
values and as a whole it is negative.
So, at present moment we have proven that alternative (i) of Lemma 9.3 is realized. This implies
that for some ε > 0 on the interval (τ, τ + ε) the contractual process goes with a break of gross
contract and only one agent is active. Let i0 be this individual. Only this individual (from
complementarity slackness conditions from Lemma 9.1) can be really active on the interval
(τ, τ + ε) and, therefore,
βi0(t) > 0, βj(t) = 0, ∀ j 6= i, ∀ t ∈ (τ, τ + ε).
At last, applying Lemma 9.2 we can in these relations pass to limit for t→ τ + 0 (all functions
are continuous) concluding that βi0(τ) > 0 and βj(τ) = 0, ∀ j 6= i0. Thus, the individual i0 is
sole really active agent on the interval [τ, τ + ε).
Below, on former assuming that x(τ) is not equilibrium we prove the validity of alternative (iii).
With this in mind we first show, that for every t > τ the mutually beneficial exchange without
partial break of gross contract x(t)−ω is impossible. Assuming opposite, find t′ > τ as infimum
of all moments where the exchange without break is possible. It is clear, that the set of all such
moments forms an open set on (τ, +∞) and t′ can not belong to it. Therefore, at the moment
t′ the mutually beneficial exchange without break is impossible. Besides x(t′) can not be an
equilibrium since the exchange goes after moment t′. Now we can apply Lemmas 9.1, 9.3 and
reasoning similar to described above we can conclude the existence of δ > 0 such that at every
point of interval [t′, t′ + δ) the contractual process is realized with partial break of contracts.
In a result we come to the contradiction with a choice of the moment t′.
Further we define τ1 = τ and find the moment τ2 as infimum of all those moments of time from
(τ1, +∞) when there is at least one another active individual distinct from i0. If there are no
such moments then τ2 = +∞ and everything is proven. Let us assume τ2 < +∞ and show that
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x(τ2) is an equilibrium. First of all note that at the moment τ2 only individual i0 can be really
active. Really at this moment the mutually beneficial exchange without break is impossible
and on the interval (τ1, τ2) only i0 is active, therefore, applying Lemma 9.1 we obtain
βi0(t) > 0, βj(t) = 0, ∀ j 6= i0, ∀ t ∈ (τ1, τ2).
Further, in view of Lemma 9.2 all functions βi(·), i ∈ I are continuous on [τ1, τ2] and, passing
to limits by t→ τ2 − 0 we conclude
βi0(τ2) ≥ 0, βj(τ2) = 0, ∀ j 6= i0.
Further, if βi0(τ2) 6= 0 we are in conditions of alternative (i) from Lemma 9.3 and hence for
some ε > 0 on interval (τ2, τ2 + ε) does exist only one active individual. By the choice τ2 this
individual can not be i0. Therefore i0 is passive on (τ2, τ2 + ε) and once again via Lemma 9.1
we conclude βi0(t) = 0 on the interval (τ2, τ2 + ε). However βi0(t) is continuous function on
(τ2, τ2 + ε) by Lemma 9.2. Now passing to a limit by t → τ2 + 0 we conclude βi0(τ2) = 0.
The received contradiction proves that βi0(τ2) = 0. However above it was established that
βj(τ2) = 0, ∀ j 6= i0. This is possible only for equilibrium point (since at the point x(τ2)
gradients of all individuals are pairwise collinear this is Pareto optimum which is also stable
relative to the partial break of gross contract). Theorem 9.1 has proven.
One of our main results is presented in the following theorem on convergence of non-degenerate
benevolent UB-processes.
Theorem 9.2. Let E be a regular economy and the standard assumptions are fulfilled. Then
any non-degenerate benevolent UB-processes converges to an equilibrium.
As a corollary of this theorem applying Thom’s theorems on density and openness of transversal
sections it seems possible to prove the following result on generic convergence of benevolent
contractual processes to an equilibrium.
Corollary 9.3. For almost all economies of C2-class every benevolent contractual UB-process
converges to an equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 9.2. Theorem 9.1 and its Corollary 9.2 can be applied in the conditions of
this theorem. Thus, each limit point of a trajectory is an equilibrium. Further we show, that
in conditions of Theorem 9.2 every benevolent trajectory can have only one limit point.
Assume contrary and let x, y be two different limit points of a trajectory. Let’s consider a
linear segment with the ends x, y, i.e., the set {γx + (1− γ)y | 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1}. Across each point
z(γ) = γx + (1− γ)y, γ ∈ (0, 1) of the segment one can conduct a hyperplane so that points x,
y are strictly in the different half-spaces. For example, such hyperplane H(γ) can be conducted
as a hyperplane which has y−x as a vector of its normal. It is clear, that in such manner we can
define a family of pairwise-not-crossed hyperplanes depending on parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) such that
our two different limit points of trajectory are placed in two different open half-spaces defined
by H(γ). Hence, when time elapses the trajectory crosses every hyperplane infinite number
of times and any limit point of these points of crossing is also a limit point of trajectory and,
therefore, this is an equilibrium. Thus, the economy has a continuum of different equilibria,
since for different γ we have limit points from different parallel hyperplanes. However each
regular economy has a finite number of equilibria. This contradiction proves that there is the
only limit point and, hence, benevolent UB-contractual process converges to an equilibrium.
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10. EXAMPLES OF CONTRACTUAL PROCESSES:
CONVERGENCE AND CYCLING
In this section35 we consider some additional examples revealing the character of contractual
processes. Besides there are described computer programs and results of computer modelling.
10.1. Convergence of UB-processes in an 2× 3 economy
In this item we describe a computer program simulating proper-contractual process for 2 × 3
economy and also one numerical example of work of this program is presented.
The model of economy with 2 agents and 3 goods is considered, in which the preferences are
defined by Cobb–Douglas functions in the logarithmic form:
u1(x) = a11 ln(x1) + a12 ln(x2) + a13 ln(x3), x 0,
u2(y) = a21 ln(y1) + a22 ln(y2) + a23 ln(y3), y  0.
On the start of the program there are determined the parameters of utility functions and initial
endowments:
a = ((a11, a12, a13), (a21, a22, a23)), ω = ((ω
1
1, ω
2
1, ω
3
1), (ω
1
2, ω
2
2, ω
3
2)).
There are also determined specific parameters: step > 0 (step) and tochn > 0 (closeness).
Applying these data program finds an equilibrium and constructs a sequence of allocations
(x, y)(0), (x, y)(1) . . . , (x, y)(n) corresponding to the rules of proper-contractual process (this one
can see from algorithm), and represents the results graphically.
The only equilibrium is found from the following system of equations:
ω11 + ω
1
2 = x¯1 + y¯1, ω
2
1 + ω
2
2 = x¯2 + y¯2, ω
3
1 + ω
3
2 = x¯3 + y¯
3
1,
∇u1(x¯) · x¯ = ∇u1(x¯) · ω1, ∇u1(x¯) = α · ∇u2(y¯), α > 0.
Schema of program algorithm:
0. Program finds equilibrium.
1. (x, y)(0) := ω.
2. Program finds a mutually beneficial contract v(n) = (v1, v2) as follows:
(*) in cube [−0.5×step, 0.5×step]3 a point v1 is randomly chosen relative to uniform distribution
and v2 := −v1 is defined. If contract v = (v1, v2) is mutually beneficial (i.e. u1(x(n) + v1) >
u1(x
(n)) and u2(y
(n) + v2) > u2(y
(n))) then item 3; otherwise return to (*).
3. (x, y)(n+1) := (x, y)(n) + v(n).
If after signing of this contract the trajectory does not leave the limits the maximal surface then
item 4. Otherwise this point is projected onto surface: from a linear segment [(x, y)(n) + v, ω]
a point inside area limited by maximal surface is chosen at a distance no more 0.01× step from
the maximal surface. Then:
(x, y)(n+1) := the projected point.
35 These examples and programs were constructed in collaboration with Sergey Kolbin, IV year student of MMF
NSU (during 2005–2006 years I supervised his bachelor diploma).
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Table 1. Discrete proper contractual trajectory: computation results of each 30th step for 1st agent
1st good x
(k)
1 2nd good x
(k)
2 3rd good x
(k)
3 break degree:
‖(x,y)(k+1)−(x,y)(k)‖
‖v(k)‖
9 9 2 ω1
9.002 8.956 2.048 inside
8.234 8.802 2.647 inside
7.455 8.353 3.469 inside
6.785 8.092 4.285 inside
6.044 7.681 5.148 inside
5.167 7.187 6.021 inside
4.638 6.673 6.825 inside
3.743 6.347 7.705 inside
3.261 5.454 8.669 inside
2.642 4.876 9.398 0.845
2.552 4.420 9.410 0.532
2.396 4.218 9.416 0.726
2.345 3.756 9.426 0.668
2.384 3.384 9.433 0.831
2.370 3.119 9.437 0.334
2.259 2.955 9.441 0.470
2.184 2.813 9.444 0.404
2.119 2.676 9.446 0.841
2.027 2.611 9.447 0.953
1.918 2.610 9.448 0.949
1.880 2.545 9.449 0.945
1.925 2.397 9.451 0.824
1.882 2.368 9.451 0.943
1.844 2.360 9.452 0.129
1.761 2.258 9.454 equilibrium
4. Point (x, y)(n+1) becomes visible on monitor and point’s parameters are written into the file.
5. If the distance from (x, y)(n+1) to equilibrium is more than step×tochn then item 2. Otherwise
we think that trajectory arrives at equilibrium and program stops.
Table 1 reduces the results of the program work for the following numerical example. The
preferences are defined by utility functions
u1(x) = ln(x1) + ln(x2) + 9 ln(x3), u2(y) = 9 ln(y1) + 10 ln(y2) + ln(y3).
Initial endowments: ω = (ω1, ω2) = ((9, 9, 2), (1, 5, 8)). Then (the only) equilibrium allocation
is (x¯, y¯) = ((1.761, 2.258, 9.454), (8.239, 11.742, 0.546)).
In the program the parameters step=0.1, tochn=1 were given and one can see that a generated
by the computer sequence of allocations (x, y)(n) “arrives” to equilibrium. Table 1 presents every
30th point of sequence x(1), x(2), . . . , x(n), i.e., only the consumption of 1st agent is described: the
amount of the first good consumed by 1st agent at each 30th step forms the first column, second
column contains analogous results for 2nd good and so on. The estimations of the contracts
break are specified in fourth column. These estimations are defined as a quotient of length
of real progress of a trajectory to the length of signed contract, i.e., written ‖(x,y)
(n+1)−(x,y)(n)‖
‖v(n)‖
when the trajectory is moving by the maximal surface and it is applied “inside” if the current
point is in the interior of area limited by maximal surface.
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Fig. 8. Exchange dynamics between 1st and 2nd goods
Graphically the trajectory is presented as follows. Fig. 8 represents (x1(t), x2(t)) for each step of
the program work. The grey colour is applied for the points inside the limits of maximal surface,
black — the moving by the maximal surface. Similarly, the dynamics of pairs (x2(t), x3(t)) and
(x3(t), x1(t)) is represented in Figures 9 and 10, accordingly.
10.2. Absence of convergence for 4× 2 economy under assumptions
CUB, IBA
Let us consider economy with 4 individuals which utilities define a family of indifference curves
as it is presented in Fig. 12. At the starting time moment (t = 0) the current allocation coincides
with the initial endowments: x1(0) = ω1 = (9, 1), x2(0) = ω2 = (3, 3), x3(0) = ω3 = (3, 9),
x4(0) = ω1 = (3, 4). Further, let in a time interval (0, t1) the coalition {1, 2} be active, in an
interval (t1, t2) the coalition {2, 3} is active, {3, 4} is active in limits (t2, t3) and in an interval
(t3, t4) the coalition {4, 1} is active. Let’s assume also that in the nearest future the order of
coalition activity is: {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {4, 1} and that each time interval of activity is short
enough. Suppose that for this interval of time a coalition have enough time only to break
contracts signed in the past and have no time to sign a new contract. The specified modes of
coalitions activity in time is visualized in Fig. 11.
Let further the signing of intra-coalition contracts is realized in the following way. On the
segment (0, t1) a contract v
{1,2} = (
−−−→
ω1A1,
−−−→
ω2A2) is signed and realized. The bundles of goods
for the first and second individuals at the moment t1 are A1 and A2, accordingly. Further, on
(t1, t2) a contract v
{2,3} = (
−−−→
A2B2,
−−−→
ω3A3) is signed and realized by {2, 3}. Thus, the bundles of
goods for 2nd and 3rd individuals at the moment t2 are B2 and A3, accordingly. Further, on
an interval (t2, t3) a contract v
{3,4} = (
−−−→
A3B3,
−−−→
ω4A4) is realized by {3, 4}. So, the bundles of 3rd
and 4th at the moment of time t3 are B3 and A4, accordingly. At last, on an interval (t3, t4) a
contract v{4,1} = (
−−−→
A4B4,
−−−→
A1B1) is realized. In doing so the bundles of 4th and 1st at the moment
t4 become equal to B4 and B1, accordingly. Thus, at the moment of time t4 the commodity
bundle of agent i corresponds to the point Bi in the figure and the point Ai is the result of the
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Fig. 9. Exchange dynamics between 2nd and 3rd goods
Fig. 10. Exchange dynamics between 1st and 3rd goods
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Fig. 11. Activity order for bilateral coalitions in 4× 2 economy
first stage of barter exchange of the individual i: for each individual it is realized on a time
interval and with an appropriate partner. In each presented diagram there are specified the
coalitions which signed contract resulting the specified consumer program. One can also see
from the figures that all above-stated contracts are mutually beneficial. Moreover, completing
these diagrams if necessary it is possible to design appropriate indifference curves in such
manner that each signing of new contract is carried out in accordance with principles of proper-
contractual process, where in each stage of barter exchange the role of “new” endowments plays
the sum of initial endowments with a flow of goods received from contracts signed him in others
coalitions.
When all acts of described bilateral contracts are realized, at the moment t4 the coalition
{1, 2} is active again. However now 1st agent finds that it is favourable for him to partially
break contract v{1,2} with 2nd agent and he/she completely breaks it raising his/her utility
from consumption. As a result new commodity bundles of 1st and 2nd agents are the vectors
corresponding to the points C1 and C2 in the figure, accordingly. In so doing since the interval
of coalition activity is short, the agents have no time to sign a new contract. Next active
coalition is {2, 3}. Now 2nd agent completely breaks the contract v{2,3} signed him in the past
in coalition {2, 3}. Consumption bundles of 2nd and 3rd become ω2 and C3, accordingly. Then
coalition {3, 4} is next to be active. Now 3rd agent observes that it is favourable for him to
break off the contract v{3,4}. As a result ω3 and C4 become the consumption bundles of 3rd
and 4th, accordingly. Finally coalition {4, 1} becomes an active one. However once again there
is an agent, now it is 4th, which desires to break off coalition contract v{4,1}. The result of this
is that ω4 and ω1 become 4th and 1st consumption bundles, accordingly.
Thus, one can see that the contractual trajectory has returned to the allocation of initial en-
dowments and considered contractual process is cycled: the signing of last contract by coalition
{4, 1} caused a breaking chain (likes avalanche) of all contracts! What can be said about this
occasion? If the 1st individual were able to expect such development of events at a stage when
he/she was signing contract with 4th agent or if at once after signing this contract he/she
would limit appetites and has refused to break contract with 2nd agent, then the destruction
of contractual structure of economy did not occur... However the behavior of such type should
be clearly incorporated into the model of contractual process and this would mean essential
modernization of our theoretical conceptions about proper-contractual processes.
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Fig. 12. An example of 4× 2 economy where CUB-process is cycling and does not converge to equilibrium
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10.3. Absence of convergence for 3× 2 economy and UB-process with a
piecewise-continuous trade rule
This example demonstrates the importance of assumption on continuity of a trade rule applied
in the above analysis of proper-contractual UB-processes.
Let us consider an economy with 3 agents and 2 goods. In model there are defined an initial
resources allocation ω = (ω1, ω2, ω3) and Cobb–Douglas utility functions in logarithmic form:
u1(x) = a11 ln(x1) + a12 ln(x2), x 0,
u2(y) = a21 ln(y1) + a22 ln(y2), y  0,
u3(z) = a31 ln(z1) + a32 ln(z2), z  0.
Being defined model parameters one can find a sole equilibrium ζ¯ = (x¯, y¯, z¯) from the following
system of equations:
ω11 + ω
1
2 + ω
1
3 = x¯1 + y¯1 + z¯1, ω
2
1 + ω
2
2 + ω
2
3 = x¯2 + y¯2 + z¯2,
∇u1(x¯) = α · ∇u2(y¯) = β · ∇u3(z¯), α > 0, β > 0,
∇u1(x¯) · x¯ = ∇u1(x¯) · ω1, ∇u2(y¯) · y¯ = ∇u2(y¯) · ω2.
Further we will describe the program simulating proper-contractual process for 3× 2 economy
for the specified trade rule w : A(X) → Lc = {(v1, v2, v3) ∈ R6 | v1 + v2 + v3 = 0} and then a
numerical example of this program realization will be also considered.
On the start of the program there are determined the parameters of utility functions, initial
endowments and an unambiguously defined trade rule. There is also determined a specific
parameter step > 0. Applying these data program finds an equilibrium and constructs a
sequence of allocations ζ (1), ζ(2), . . . , ζ(n) (here ζ = (x, y, z)) corresponding to the rules of
proper-contractual process (this follows from algorithm), and represents the results graphically.
Schema of program algorithm:
0. Program finds equilibrium.
1. ζ(0) := ω.
2. Program finds a mutually beneficial contract w(ζ (n)) = (w1, w2, w3) in accordance with trade
rule.
3. ζ(n+1) := ζ(n) + w(ζ(n)).
If after signing of this contract the trajectory does not leave the limits the maximal surface then
item 4. Otherwise the projection of this point onto maximal surface is realized: from a linear
segment [ζ(n) +w(ζ(n)), ω] a point inside area limited by maximal surface is chosen at a distance
no more 0.01× step from the maximal surface. Then:
ζ(n+1) := the projected point.
4. The point is visualized onto monitor and its parameters are written into the file.
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5. If the distance from ζ(n+1) to equilibrium is more than 0.01× step then item 2. Otherwise we
think that trajectory arrives at equilibrium and program stops.
Further we study the numerical example. Let preferences be defined on intR2+ via the following
utility functions:
u1(x)=47 ln(x1) + 23 ln(x2), u2(y)=18 ln(y1) + 54 ln(y2), u3(z)=17 ln(z1) + 21 ln(z2).
Initial endowments are: ω = (ω1, ω2, ω3) = ((1, 4), (15, 3), (2, 5)). Let us also determine the
following piecewise-continuous trade rule w : A(X) → Lc which is different in each of the
following areas A1, A2 dividing the set of all feasible allocations into two parts. In each area
there is a constrain only on x 0, and variables y  0 and z  0 may take any values. Define
A1 = {ζ = (x, y, z) ≥ 0 | x2 ≤ −0.1463x1 + 2.6968},
A2 = {ζ = (x, y, z) ≥ 0 | x2 > −0.1463x1 + 2.6968}
and denote w(ζ) = w′(ζ) when ζ ∈ A1 and w(ζ) = w′′(ζ) for ζ ∈ A2.
Further let us formally define for the area A1 a trade rule w
′ : A1(X) → Lc via the following
algorithm (in A2 the rule w
′′(ζ) is similarly defined).
First of all for each couple of individuals i, j, i < j we construct an auxiliary vector vij(ζ)
specifying some mutually beneficial exchange for the current allocation ζ. For each couple of
agents this vector is constructed by some common rule; we describe it, for example, for a pair
{1, 2}. Let us define
g(ζ) = ∇u1(x) +∇u2(y)
and consider the orthogonal complement to g(ζ) in R2, i.e. a straight line defined via equation
〈χ, g(ζ)〉 = 0, χ = (χ1, χ2) ∈ R2. It follows from the definition g(ζ) that if gradients are non-
collinear then for the point of the line the values 〈χ,∇u1(x)〉 and 〈χ,∇u2(y)〉 are nonzero and
have different sign; for collinear gradients they are equal to zero. Further consider a directional
vector of the line, e.g. it may be ( g2
g1+g2
,− g1
g1+g2
) = χ¯ (it defines the line in a parametrical
form χ = γχ¯, γ ∈ R). At last define v12(ζ) = χ¯ if 〈χ¯,∇u1(x)〉 > 0 and put v12(ζ) = −χ¯ for
〈χ¯,∇u1(x)〉 < 0. Clearly that in this way we correctly define a continuous map ζ → v12(ζ)
which obeys the condition that contract (v12(ζ),−v12(ζ)) is mutually beneficial in non-strict
form:
〈v12(ζ),∇u1(x)〉 ≥ 0, 〈−v12(ζ),∇u2(y)〉 ≥ 0.
Moreover if gradients are non-collinear then these inequalities are realized in strict form.
Further let us define a trade rule having appropriate properties and constructed via described
maps vij(ζ).
For the area A1 the rule is defined by formula
w′(x, y, z) = β(ζ)
(
v12(x, y) +
v13(x, z)
20
,−v12(x, y) + v
23(y, z)
20
,
−v13(x, z)− v23(y, z)
20
)
,
and for A2 by formula
w′′(x, y, z) = β(ζ)
(
v12(x, y) + v13(x, z)
20
, v23(y, z)− v
12(x, y)
20
,−v23(y, z)− v
13(x, z)
20
)
,
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where β is an scalar parameter chosen in an appropriate way which continuously depends on
current allocation ζ = (x, y, z).
Next let us show that vectors in brackets of last expressions present mutually beneficial con-
tracts. The fact that they are contracts is checked directly. They are also (non-strict) the
mutually beneficial contracts because for i < j by construction vij(ζ) we have
〈∇ui(ζ), vij(ζ)〉 ≥ 0, 〈∇uj(ζ),−vij(ζ)〉 ≥ 0,
that summing appropriate inequalities gives 〈∇ui(ζ), w′i(ζ)〉 ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3 and analogous thing
for w′′(ζ) can be obtained. Moreover, if for the current allocation there is at least one couple of
individuals, whose gradients are non-collinear then all these inequalities have to be strict, i.e.
they are really mutually beneficial contracts.
At last, if we shall manage to find parameter β so that to change the length of a vector specifying
in our rule the “direction” of exchange (barter proportions) then we can receive the increase of
individual utilities as a result of contract w(ζ) signing; i.e., we need to do so that
u1(x + w1(x, y, z)) > u1(x), u2(y + w2(x, y, z)) > u2(y), u3(z + w3(x, y, z)) > u3(z) (10.1)
be true for an appropriate area of definition.
Further we describe a method allowing us to find parameter β for w′(ζ) (for w′′(ζ) it is done
analogously). Define
β(ζ) =
1
2
min{b1, b2, b3},
where once again bi = min{step, ci}, i = 1, 2, 3 for the values ci which are found in the following
way:
i = 1, then c1 is a solution of equation u1(x + c1(v
12(x, y) + v
13(x,z)
20
)) = u1(x) if it is solvable
one; otherwise c1 = +∞.
i = 2, then c2 is a solution of equation u2(y + c2(−v12(x, y) + v23(y,z)20 )) = u2(y) if it is solvable
one; otherwise c2 = +∞.
i = 3, then c3 is a solution of equation u3(z + c3(
−v13(x,z)−v23(y,z)
20
)) = u3(z) if it is solvable one;
otherwise c3 = +∞.
It is easy to see, that variables bi(ζ) > 0 are correctly determined and are the continuous
functions of its argument (formally one need apply the implicit function theorem and use strict
concavity of utilities). Hence, β(ζ) > 0 is also a continuous function. It has to be also clear from
construction that (10.1) is fulfilled that finishes the description of a trade rule. In conclusion
we note only that program parameter step > 0 appearing in construction of bi(ζ) is used not
only to define a necessary value (to do it one can take any positive number) but also to adjust
the “length” of trajectory moving along a vector specifying the exchange proportions. Thus,
reducing parameter step > 0 we approach the described discrete process to the theoretical
continuous process.
For the given example the contractual trajectory constructed by the program does not converge
to equilibrium. It is visible from the following Fig. 13 in which the points ζ (n) = (x(n), y(n), z(n))
of a proper-contractual trajectory are depicted. It is curious to note, that if one applies any of
rules w′(ζ), w′′(ζ) as a rule for the whole set of feasible allocations A(X) then in our economy
the proper-contractual UB-process is converging in computer sense...
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Fig. 13. Dynamics of proper contractual process with piecewise continuous trading rule in 3× 2 economy
11. CONCLUSION
The present investigation includes the following results:
1. The extensive survey of literature, connected with processes, driving economic system
to equilibrium. Particularly, the following processes are described and their advantages and
shortcomings are discussed:
a) Walrasian taˆtonnement processes driving economic system to equilibrium.
b) Processes of change of the prices, using Jacobi matrix for excess demand function.
c) Disequilibrium models of trade processes.
d) Edgeworth’s processes.
e) Strategic approach.
General volume of the quoted here literature has made about 30 items.
2. Contractual processes are in detail described and, first of all, proper-contractual ones — they
are processes, in which partial breaking of the contracts is allowed. With this in mind several
basic hypotheses, determining the character of contracts’ breaking process, are formulated in a
general kind and for major particular cases. They are the following:
(IB) — instantaneous breaking of the contracts;
(UB) — uniform breaking of all contracts;
(CUB) — uniform breaking of gross within-coalitional contracts.
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Combinations of these hypotheses result to proper-contractual trajectories of a different kind
of a generality. Under (IB) and (UB) contractual trajectory turns out aggregated, Under (IB)
and (CUB) — coalitional-contractual; there are given formal and mathematically reasonable
definitions. In my opinion, the coalitional-contractual trajectory should serve the central
concept in further researches. Besides, there is described specific contractual process, adequate
a case of the pairwise bargains and to simultaneous breaking of contracts not only in active,
but also in passive coalitions. At last, concept of trade rule is introduced; this is a map,
unequivocally determining mutually beneficial contract for the current consumption plans,
having some additional good mathematical properties. By use of a trade rule a contractual
trajectory of each mentioned kinds is unequivocally determined. The special type of benevolent
rules of trade is stood out as rules which determine a new contract allowing the break of
gross barter contract only if being realized every new mutually beneficial contract involves
contracts’ breaking. Just for this class of benevolent processes the basic positive results about
convergence were received.
3. For considered kinds of proper-contractual trajectories a variant of parallel price process
is offered. In this process the current prices are determined as an average (in specific sense)
vector of exchange proportions under all bargains, really carried out for the current time
moment.
4. Presented analysis of convergence of contractual trajectories has given the following results:
a) For the economies with 2 individuals and 2 commodities convergence of proper contrac-
tual processes relative to any continuous trading rule has proven under rather general
assumptions. Local stability of equilibria was also investigated and a reasonable criterion
for this was suggested.
b) The theorem on convergence to equilibrium of non-degenerate benevolent UB-contractual
processes has been proven. In addition, local stability of equilibria relative to benevolent
trading rules was analyzed; however appropriate theorem was proven only for 2 agents
economy with an arbitrary finite commodity space.
c) A series of model examples are presented demonstrating specific properties of contractual
processes in different cases. There are examples for converged process and also two
examples where the contractual process is cycling. First of them presents economy with 4
agents and 2 commodities and coalitional contractual process (CUB). In second example
for economy with 3 agents UB-process with piecewise continuous trading rule is cycling.
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APPENDICES
A1. List of notations and special symbols
Let C be a subset of topological vector space, then:
int C denotes the interior of C,
ri C (relative interior) denotes the interior of C relative to its affine hull aff C,
co C denotes convex hull,
cl C denotes the closure of C.
E = Rl is l-dimension commodity space.
I = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents.
L = En = EI is the space of economy allocations.
Lc = {(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ EI |
∑
I vi = 0} is the space of contracts.
Xi = E+ = Rl+ is consumption set of agent i ∈ I.
X =
∏
i∈I Xi.
ωi ∈ Xi is the vector of ith agent initial endowments.
ω = (ωi)i∈I ∈ X is the vector of initial endowments of all traders of the economy.
ui : Xi → R is i’s agent utility function.
A(X) = {x = (xi)i∈I ∈ X |
∑
i∈I xi =
∑
i∈I ωi} is the set of all feasible allocations.
{xi ∈ Xi | 〈∇ui(xi), xi − ωi〉 = 0} is the maximal surface of agent i ∈ I.
hi(xi) = ∇ui(xi)+∇2ui(xi)(xi−ωi) is the normal vector for tangent hyperplane to i’s maximal
surface at the point xi ∈ Xi.
Ia(x) = {i ∈ I | 〈∇ui(xi), xi − ωi〉 = 0} is the set of all active individuals at x ∈ A(X).
W fr(x) = {w ∈ Lc | 〈∇ui(xi), wi〉 > 0, ∀ i ∈ I & 〈hi, wi〉 > 0, ∀ i ∈ Ia(x)} is the set
(possible empty) of all mutually beneficial contracts that being signed do not attract the break
of aggregated contract x− ω.
A2. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 7.1. So let alternative (i) be fulfilled and let starting at the moment τ ≥ 0,
only 1st individual can be active and second is passive for all t ≥ τ . Further, let x˜1 (1st
agent bundle) be any limit point of trajectory. Define x˜2 = ω1 + ω2 − x˜1 and show that
allocation (x˜1, x˜2) is Pareto optimal. Assuming contrary due to trade rule definition we conclude
〈∇u1(x˜1), v1(x˜1)〉 > 0 and by continuity this property has to be fulfilled in some neighborhood
of the point x˜1, i.e.
∃ ε > 0 : 〈∇u1(x1), v1(x1)〉 > 0, ∀x1 ∈ B2ε(x˜1),
where B2ε(x˜1) is closed ball with the radius 2ε centered at the point x˜1. Since the ball is a
compact set and by continuity it is equivalent to
∃ ε > 0, δ > 0 : 〈∇u1(x1), v1(x1)〉 > δ, ∀x1 ∈ B2ε(x˜1). (11.1)
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We observe from this that one can come to a contradiction if one manages to show that the
current point of trajectory is in the ball during infinite (by measure) time.
Really, since 2nd agent is passive (almost everywhere) and because 1st agent utility is increasing
monotonically along the trajectory (starting at the moment τ) the following estimations are
fulfilled:
u1(x1(t))− u1(x1(τ)) =
∫ t
τ
du1(x1(ζ))
dζ
dζ =
∫ t
τ
〈∇u1(x1(ζ)), x˙1(ζ)〉dζ ≥
≥
∫ t
τ
〈∇u1(x1(ζ)), v1(x1(ζ))〉dζ ≥
∫
[τ,t]∩Ω
〈∇u1(x1(ζ)), v1(x1(ζ))〉dζ ≥ δ · µ([τ, t] ∩ Ω).
Here Ω ⊂ [τ, +∞] is the set of all time moments when a current point of trajectory x1(ζ)
is located in the ball B2ε(x˜1) and µ([τ, t] ∩ Ω) is Lebesgue measure of the set [τ, t] ∩ Ω. If
µ(Ω) = +∞ we have µ([τ, t] ∩ Ω)→ +∞ for t→ +∞. Then due to the last estimation it has
to be u1(x1(t)) → +∞ that is impossible since the set of all allocation is compact and utility
function is continuous.
Let us show that µ(Ω) = +∞. It is obvious if starting at some time moment t ≥ τ all points
of trajectory are located in the ball. In the contrary case one can find an enumerable set of
moments tk, t
′
k, k = 1, 2 . . . such that ‖ x1(tk) − x˜1 ‖< ε and t′k > tk is a closest after tk time
moment when the trajectory leaves the ball, i.e.
‖x1(t′k)− x˜1‖ = 2ε & ‖x1(ζ)− x˜1‖ < 2ε, ∀ ζ ∈ [tk, t′k).
However in such a case we have an estimation:
ε ≤ ‖x1(t′k)− x1(tk)‖ = ‖
∫ t′
k
tk
x˙1(ζ)dζ‖ ≤
∫ t′
k
tk
‖x˙1(ζ)‖dζ ≤ c
∫ t′
k
tk
dζ = c(t′k − tk),
where c > 0 is an upper bound for the norm of right hand part of the law (4.8), i.e. this is a
value satisfying
c ≥ ‖λmin(x, v1)(x1 − ω1) + v1(x1)‖, ∀x1 ∈ B2ε(x˜1).
Due to imposed assumptions and from the compactness and continuity of objects that we need
it is easy to prove that the right hand part of this inequality is bounded from above and,
therefore, such c > 0 does exist. As a result we have got the estimation
(t′k − tk) ≥
ε
c
> 0, ∀ k = 1, 2, . . .
Moreover via construction all intervals [tk, t
′
k] are pairwise non-intersected and [tk, t
′
k] ⊂ Ω,
∀ k = 1, 2, . . . Therefore, µ(Ω) = +∞. Thus we obtain a contradiction that proves Pareto
optimality of the allocation under study.
To state the second part of lemma remember that every allocation from the interior of
direct product of consumption sets which is Pareto optimal and simultaneously stable relative
to the partial break of gross contract is an equilibrium, see Theorem 2.2 from Marakulin (2003).
Proof of Lemma 7.2. Let τ ′ be some time moment when first agent is active. Now define a time
moment when 1st agent is active τ 11 ≥ τ ′ and such that it is earlier of first moment τ ′′ > t′ when
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2nd agent is active and such that on the interval (τ 11 , τ
′′) both agents are passive. Here τ 11 is the
latest moment of 1st agent activity on the interval [τ ′, τ ′′). Analogously, for 2nd agent one can
find a moment τ 21 as a moment of last his/her activity up to the nearest moment τ
′′′ > τ ′′ when
1st agent is active. In view of compactness and continuity of objects under study all considered
time moments do exist. For example, τ ′′ and τ 11 can be found by formulas
τ ′′ = min{t ∈ [τ ′, +∞) | 〈∇u2(x2(t)), x2(t)− ω2〉 = 0},
τ 11 = max{t ∈ [τ ′, τ ′′] | 〈∇u1(x1(t)), x1(t)− ω1〉 = 0}.
Further taking the point τ ′′′ as “initial” (i.e. instead of τ ′) in the described above procedure,
one can find the moments τ 12 and τ
2
2 , accordingly. Show that constructed in this way fragments
of sequences that we need to be found obey the requirement (7.1). With this in mind first let
us better understand the geometry of moving of a trajectory and reveal some peculiarities of
this moving.
Really by construction on intervals [τ 11 , τ
′′] and [τ 21 , τ
1
2 ] the 1st agent utility increases: it is
so because only mutually beneficial contracts are signed during contractual process and also
because in our intervals 2nd agent is passive. It has to be shown that for all points t from
interval [τ ′′, τ 21 ] the inequality u1(x1(t)) > u1(x1(τ
1
1 )) is fulfilled. Let us do it.
Now consider the moment τ ′′. By construction the following relations
〈∇u1(x1(τ ′′)), v1(x1(τ ′′))〉 > 0, 〈∇u2(x2(τ ′′)), v1(x1(τ ′′))〉 < 0,
〈∇u2(x2(τ ′′)), x1(τ ′′)− ω1〉 = 0
have to be true. Moreover if h2(x2(τ
′′)) = ∇u2(x2(τ ′′))−∇2u2(x2(τ ′′))(x1(τ ′′)− ω1) satisfies36
〈h2(x2(τ ′′)), v1(x1(τ ′′))〉 < 0,
then the condition (4.5) of contracts break is violated and it means that a trajectory only
“touches” with maximal surface at the point x1(τ
′′) and then “leaves” it. Therefore in a
neighborhood of the moment τ ′′ a break of contracts does not occur and both utilities are
locally increased. A break of contracts may occur only if
〈h2(x2(τ ′′)), v1(x1(τ ′′))〉 ≥ 0
and if for small ∆t > 0 at the points τ ′′ + ∆t this inequality is strict. Thus after the “going
through” the point x1(τ
′′) a trajectory x1(t) will move some non-zero time in framework of
ε-extension of a cone with the vertex at the point x1(τ
′′) which is defined by inequalities:
〈h2(x2(τ ′′)), x1〉 ≥ 〈h2(x2(τ ′′)), x1(τ ′′)〉,
〈∇u2(x2(τ ′′)), x1〉 ≤ 〈∇u2(x2(τ ′′)), x1(τ ′′)〉 = 〈∇u2(x2(τ ′′)), ω1〉.
More exactly, due to 〈h2(x2(t)), x˙2(t)〉 = 0, see (4.2), a limit deviation of trajectory will be
realized along an edge of this cone, see Fig. 5.
Further, on interval [τ 11 , τ
′′] in the plane a trajectory x1(t) circumscribes an continuous curve
with the ends x1(τ
1
1 ) and x1(τ
′′) such that for t ∈ (τ 11 , τ ′′) the points x1(t) are located strictly
36 Remember that x2(τ
′′)− ω2 = −(x1(τ ′′)− ω1) and v2(x2(τ ′′)) = −v1(x1(τ ′′)).
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“below” than a point of maximal surface being intersected with the ray starting from ω1 and
going through the point x1(t), because 〈∇ui(xi(t)), xi(t)−ωi〉 > 0, i = 1, 2. Moreover for t < τ ′′
and close to τ ′′ it has to be
〈∇u2(x2(τ ′′)), x1(τ ′′)〉<〈∇u2(x2(τ ′′)), x1(t)〉 ⇐⇒ 〈∇u2(x2(τ ′′)), x1(t)− x1(τ
′′)
τ ′′ − t 〉>0,
because v2(x1(τ
′′)) = −v1(x1(τ ′′)) ≈ x1(t)−x1(τ ′′)τ ′′−t . Thus there exists a moment t′ < τ ′′ such that
x1(t
′) − ω1 = γ(x1(τ ′′) − ω1) for some 0 < γ < 1 and, simultaneously, all points of trajectory
from interval t ∈ [τ 11 , t′] obey 〈∇u2(x2(τ ′′)), x1(t)〉 < 〈∇u2(x2(τ ′′)), ω1〉. The similar inequality
has to be fulfilled for the points x1(t), t ∈ [τ ′′, τ 21 ] because contracts are mutually beneficial and
1st agent is passive on this time interval.
Further we are going to the final part of the proof. Assume that for some t ∈ [τ ′′, τ 21 ] the
inequality u1(x1(t)) ≤ u1(x1(τ 11 )) is fulfilled. Now from the continuity and due to presented
above reasonings it follows that there are moments t′′ < τ ′′ and τ ′′ < t′′′ ≤ τ 21 such that
x1(t
′′) = x1(t
′′′) is true. Consider the first possible moment of this type (one needs to take
minimal t′′′ having this property). For t′′ > τ 11 we have a contradiction since then our
trajectory is cycling (due to the law of change is autonomous) and never arrives to a point
on 1st agent maximal surface but it has to be so at the moment τ 12 > t
′′′. Therefore, it has
to be t′′ = τ 11 . However x1(τ
1
1 ) is a point on 1st agent maximal surface where 2nd agent is
passive. Hence there is a neighborhood of x1(τ
1
1 ) such that 1st agent utility strictly increases
along every trajectory starting from any point from the neighborhood. Therefore for all
small enough ε > 0 it has to be u1(x1(t
′′′ − ε)) < u1(x1(t′′′)). Moreover for some ε > 0 no
point x1(t), t ∈ (t′′′ − ε, t′′′) can be located on 2nd agent maximal surface (otherwise at the
point x1(t
′′′) = x(τ 11 ) both individuals are active that is possible only at an equilibrium which
trajectory can never leave). Therefore the last moment of trajectory being on 2nd agent
maximal surface, by definition this is the moment τ 21 , has to be realized earlier the moment t
′′′
because the point x1(t
′′′) = x1(t
′′) = x(τ 11 ) is located on 1st agent maximal surface. Thus, it has
to be t′′′ > τ 21 but this is impossible. The obtained contradictions finish the proof of Lemma 7.2.
Proof of Proposition 8.1. Let Vx¯ be a neighborhood of equilibrium point x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2) which
existence is postulated in Proposition 8.1. Consider a vector-function f : Vx¯ → R2 where
fi(yi) = min{ui(yi), ui(x¯i)}, i = 1, 2.
Show that this function is (non-strictly) monotonically increasing along benevolent contractual
trajectory.
In fact, for x(t) ∈ Vx¯ either Ia(x(t)) = ∅ but then at the point x(t) contractual process is going
without break and monotonicity is obvious, or Ia(x(t)) 6= ∅. In the last case if W fr(x(t)) 6= ∅
then monotonicity follows from (8.2), in a contrary case W fr(x(t)) = ∅ and one can apply
(8.3). Further we first note that (u1(x1(t)), u2(x2(t))) < (u1(x¯1), u2(x¯2)) is impossible because
otherwise the equilibrium x¯ Pareto dominates x = x(t) and W fr(x(t)) 6= ∅. Therefore, since
by (8.3) it has to be uj(xj(t)) ≤ uj(x¯j), j ∈ Ia(x(t)) and then ui(xi(t)) > ui(x¯i) for i 6= j.
However in this case by specification fi(xi(t
′)) = fi(x¯i) for all t
′ ≥ t close enough to t. The
activity of j also implies that the function fj(xj(t
′)) is locally increasing for t′ ≥ t.
Further, due to assumption that utility functions are strictly concave and since equilibrium
allocation is Pareto optimal it is not difficult to prove that the sets
V εx¯ = {y ∈ A(X) | f1(y1) ≥ f1(x¯1)− ε & f2(y2) ≥ f2(x¯2)− ε}, ε > 0
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form a basis of neighborhoods for the point x¯ in A(X).37 Really to see this it is enough to
note that ∩ε>0V εx¯ = {x¯}. However this is true because only Pareto optimal points can be in
the intersection but for strictly concave utility functions it is impossible to find two different
allocations which are Pareto optimal and simultaneously have equal agents’ utilities. Choosing
now ε > 0 from condition V εx¯ ⊂ Vx¯ and taking V εx¯ as a neighborhood of initial data, we conclude
that the first condition of local stability (see above) is valid: a trajectory being at least one
time in this neighborhood can never leave it (due to the monotonicity of f along a benevolent
trajectory).
Further, the monotonicity of f along a trajectory and the property f(x(t)) ≤ f(x¯) allows us to
consider f as a Lyapunov vector-function but we need to show that limt→∞ x(t) = x¯. Let us do
it. Let x˜ be any limit point of trajectory x(t). The monotonicity of f implies that limt→∞ f(x(t))
does exist and also limt→∞ f(x(t)) = f(x˜) ≤ (u1(x¯1), u2(x¯2)). Show that this inequality can
be fulfilled only as equality. To do it first of all notice that the case f(x˜)  (u1(x¯1), u2(x¯2))
is obviously impossible (by Lemma 7.1 and Remark 7.1). Hence at least for one component
equality is realized. Let, for example, for 1st agent and for all large enough t it is realized:
∃ δ > 0: u1(x1(t)) < u1(x¯1) − δ. Now (8.3) and benevolence imply that the utility of this
agent is monotonically increased for all t large enough. Moreover it is easy to see that if
u2(x˜2) > u2(x¯2) then we are in condition of alternative (i) from the previous paragraph § 7.2
(see page 44) because only 1st agent can be active for t large enough. Therefore due to Lemma
7.1 and Remark 7.1 the allocation x˜ is Pareto optimal. However in so doing x˜ has to be stable
relative to partial break of gross contract x˜ − ω. Hence x˜ has to be an equilibrium allocation
from the neighborhood V εx¯ . Choosing now ε > 0 so that the neighborhood does not incudes
equilibria different from x¯ and taking this neighborhood as a neighborhood for initial data we
conclude that x˜ = x¯.
Thus we have proven that (u1(x˜1), u2(x˜2)) ≥ (u1(x¯1), u2(x¯2)). However once again it means
that x˜ is Pareto optimal and therefore it is an equilibrium. Hence x˜ = x¯. As a result: we
have found a neighborhood such that any trajectory defined by benevolent contractual process
which is going through some point of the neighborhood has all limits points equal to x¯. This
trajectory converges to x¯.
Proof of Lemma 9.3. Fist let us choose ε > 0 so that if for j ∈ I inequality
〈∇uj(xj(τ)), xj(τ)− ωj〉 > 0 is fulfilled then for all t ∈ (τ, τ + ε) the similar inequality
〈∇uj(xj(t)), xj(t)− ωj〉 > 0 is also fulfilled. It is possible in view of continuous dependence of
a trajectory from time and sice all functions participating in an inequality are continuous.
Further, let 〈∇uj(xj(τ)), xj(τ) − ωj〉 = 0 be fulfilled for some j ∈ I, j 6= i, i.e., j is another
agent distinct from i which is active at the moment τ . Applying Definition 9.1 suppose, for
example, that
〈hi(xi(τ)), vi(xi(τ))〉
〈hi(xi(τ)), ωi − xi(τ)〉 <
〈hj(xj(τ)), vj(xj(τ))〉
〈hj(xj(τ)), ωj − xj(τ)〉
holds. From a continuity of functions participating in the inequality it is possible also to find
a neighborhood of point x(τ) in A(X) and a neighborhood of point v(x(τ)) in the space of
contracts Lc such that the similar inequality is true for any point from these neighborhoods
37 It means that all these sets are neighborhoods and that every neighborhood includes a set of this type.
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replacing x(τ) and v(x(τ)), accordingly. Let δ > 0 be such that
〈hi(xi), wi〉
〈hi(xi), ωi − xi〉 <
〈hj(xj, wj〉
〈hj(xj), ωj − xj〉 , ∀x ∈ Bδ(x(τ)) ∩ A(X), ∀w ∈ Bδ(v(x(τ))) ∩ L
c
is fulfilled, where Bδ(y) denotes a ball of radius δ > 0 centered at y in an appropriate space, and
vectors hi(xi), hj(xj) are formally defined by formula (4.2) and are calculated at the designated
point of space. Moreover, without lost of generality it is possible also to think that all contracts
from Bδ(v(x(τ))) ∩ Lc are beneficial at every point from Bδ(x(τ)) ∩ A(X). This obviously
follows from the definition of the mutually beneficial contract and from the continuity of all
functions participating in required inequalities. Besides it is possible to think that numerator
and denominator in expressions from the last formula do not change a sign for all points of
chosen neighborhoods and that this is true for any pair of active individuals at the moment τ .
At last, reducing if necessary, ε > 0 can be chosen so that all points x(t) for t ∈ (τ, τ + ε) are in
the limits of the chosen neighborhood Bδ(x(τ)) of x(τ), i.e. for the time not more than ε > 0
the trajectory does not leave this neighborhood.
Further let us establish the validity of alternative (i). It is necessary to show that in conditions
of (i) an arbitrarily chosen point of the trajectory x(t), t ∈ (τ, τ + ε) is located on the maximal
surface of individual i, i.e., that 〈∇ui(xi(t)), xi(t)− ωi〉 = 0 is fulfilled.
Assuming 〈∇ui(xi(t)), xi(t)−ωi〉 > 0 find a maximum of all those moments t′ ∈ [τ, t) where the
current point of trajectory x(t′) is located on the maximal surface of agent i. As x(τ) is on the
maximal surface of the agent i, this maximum does exist and obviously that at this moment the
point of a trajectory is located on the maximal surface. Let s denote this maximum. Now we
have 〈∇ui(xi(s)), xi(s)−ωi〉 = 0 and 〈∇ui(xi(ζ)), xi(ζ)−ωi〉 > 0 for all ζ ∈ (s, t). By definition
in the interval (s, t) the law of change of a trajectory (4.8) is set by the contract v(x(ζ)) and by
(in general discontinuous) function λmin(·) which in conditions of alternative (i) by the choice
of ε and because individual i is passive for all ζ ∈ (s, t) has to satisfy
λmin(x(ζ), v(x(ζ))) > a > b >
〈hi(xi(ζ)), vi(x(ζ))〉
〈hi(xi(ζ)), ωi − xi(ζ)〉 = gi(x(ζ)), v(x(ζ)) (11.2)
for some real a, b. Further the vector hi(xi) participating the the right hand part of in-
equality (11.2) is defined by formula (4.2) and, therefore, it is the gradient of function
F (xi) = 〈∇ui(xi), xi − ωi〉 which defines maximal surface by equation F (xi) = 0. So we
have F (xi(s)) = 0 and the value F (xi(t)) can be found by formula
F (xi(t)) =
∫ t
s
F (xi(ζ))
dζ
dζ =
∫ t
s
〈∇xiF (xi(ζ)), x˙i(ζ)〉dζ,
where the function under integral is summarized (since x(·) is an absolute continuous function).
Substituting expression of under-integral functions (x˙i(ζ) via the law of trajectory) in view of
(11.2) and 〈hi(xi(ζ)), xi(ζ)− ωi〉 < 0, ∀ ζ ∈ (s, t) we obtain the following estimation
F (xi(t)) =
∫ t
s
〈hi(xi(ζ)), λmin(ζ)(xi(ζ)− ωi) + vi(xi(ζ))〉dζ ≤
≤ a
∫ t
s
〈hi(xi(ζ)), (xi(ζ)− ωi)〉dζ +
∫ t
s
≤ 〈hi(xi(ζ)), vi(xi(ζ))〉dζ ≤
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≤ (a− b)
∫ t
s
〈hi(xi(ζ)), xi(ζ)− ωi〉dζ +
∫ t
s
〈hi(xi(ζ)), gi(ζ)(xi(ζ)− ωi) + vi(xi(ζ))〉dζ =
= (a− b)
∫ t
s
〈hi(xi(ζ)), xi(ζ)− ωi〉dζ.
The last equality in the chain of estimations is true because the second integral (summand) is
equal to zero: by definition of gi(ζ) = gi(x(ζ), v(x(ζ)) in (11.2) and due to
〈hi, 〈hi, vi〉〈hi, ωi − xi〉(xi − ωi) + vi〉 = 0, xi 6= ωi.
Since
∫ t
s
〈hi(xi(ζ)), xi(ζ)− ωi〉dζ < 0 then as a result we conclude
F (xi(t)) = 〈∇ui(xi(t)), xi(t)− ωi〉 < 0,
that contradicts the initial assumption. Thus alternative (i) has proven.
In a part of the proof of alternatives (ii) and (iii) we only note that it can be done in accor-
dance with the same method as stated above. The difference consists in the formulation of an
requirement similar to (11.2) but written down concerning other parameters: only this thing is
important to obtain the key estimations. For example, for the proof of alternative (ii), for the
individual j 6= i which is active at the moment τ for a suitable time interval one needs to apply
λmin(x(ζ), v(x(ζ))) < a < b <
〈hj(xj(ζ)), vj(x(ζ))〉
〈hj(xj(ζ)), ωj − xj(ζ)〉 = gj(x(ζ)), v(x(ζ)).
Lemma 9.3 has proven.
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